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Abstract  
With the recent spate of data loss breaches from industry and commerce, especially with the large 
number of Advanced Persistent Threats, companies are increasing their network boundary security. 
As network defences are enhanced through the use of Data Loss Prevention systems (DLP), attackers 
seek new ways of exploiting and extracting confidential data. This is often done by internal parties in 
large-scale organisations through the use of steganography. The successful utilisation of 
steganography makes the exportation of confidential data hard to detect, equipped with the ability of 
escaping even the most sophisticated DLP systems. This thesis provides two effective solutions to 
prevent data loss from effective LSB image steganographic behaviour, with the potential to be applied 
in industrial DLP systems.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research Background 
In today’s digital economy, company information is stored and transferred in digital formats. The 
rapidly developing Internet era has entirely changed company business models, primarily by making 
it both easier and faster to transfer information. However, nothing is safe on the Internet. Companies 
constantly fall victim to data loss, and high-profile data leakage involving sensitive personal and 
corporate data are frequent [1]. According to the Risk Based Security Data Breach QuickView 
incidents, there were 3930 incidents reported during 2015 exposing 736 million records [2]. 
Generally, data loss mainly comes from malicious attacks, which come in the form of either internal 
attacks and external attacks. External attacks represent a compromise, often of servers, which are 
subjected to malicious attacks from outside of the company network boundaries.  External attacks are 
blocked as much as possible with the use of firewalls and security patching, combined with ethical 
hacking to address potential issues. Another large threat comes in the form of the internal attack. 
These stem from intentional (staffs transferring data on purpose by, for example, email or USB) or 
unintentional accidents to malicious exploitations of company data, often exported though the 
network or USB devices. Vormetric Data Security indicates that globally, around 89% of respondents 
felt their organization has suffered a risk from an insider attack, with 34% classifying themselves as 
feeling extremely vulnerable to attacks in the future [3]. Similarly, Risk Based Security, a cyber-security 
company,  stated 49% of threat vectors were from “inside the organization” activities [2], as show in 
Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: 2015 Exposed Records by Threat Vector 
For an enterprise, all forms of data loss (whether leakage, disappearance or damage) could cause a 
variety of consequences, at the cost of not only financial but also reputational damage. However, due 
to Data Loss Prevention systems, these risks and threats are greatly mitigated. Data Loss Prevention 
systems, better known as DLP systems, protect and monitor confidential enterprise data in three 
different states: data at rest, data at endpoints, and data in motion [4]. Any data breach which is 
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caused by malicious behaviours will be flagged and blocked in this system. Nevertheless, there is no 
all-encompassing silver bullet. For instance, If the secret data is attached in cover file images through 
steganography, it will escape DLP defence systems monitoring and consequently this is a major 
concern.  
Steganography is an ancient science for hiding the information in the communication. The inspiration 
and source of steganography came from the natural animal or plant world [5], where an organism’s 
abilities of camouflage and impersonation often significantly improve its chances of life and success. 
This “art” originated in Greek, meaning “covered writing” [6]. In early steganography, for example, the 
secret message was written on a man’s shaved head, this message was hidden naturally after his hair 
had grown back [7]. During the World War I and II, the application of invisible ink also utilized the 
concept of steganography [7]. A similar basic example is commonly known as lemonade 
steganography, which is demonstrated in Figure 2 below. Firstly, a juice was squeezed from a lemon. 
Then the juice was used as ink to write the secret message on paper and at this point the writing would 
be invisible to the naked eyes. However, this writing will reappear once this paper is placed in a high 
temperature environment. 
 
Figure 2: Lemonade steganography comparison between without (left) and with (right) a high temperature 
environment 
So far, steganography is defined as a technique for concealing information [8], and it is applied in the 
area of the computers and networks widely. In Figure 3 below, the chronological timeline of the 
development of the different carrier within steganography has been listed [5]. Unlike in cryptography, 
the steganography has unique features against relevant detections, e.g. higher resistance and 
imperceptibility [9]. Hence, the detection of steganography is often regarded as a problem worth 
researching. 
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Figure 3: Timeline of the development of the carrier in steganography 
Moreover, security often goes against user experience. Higher security results in lower user flexibility. 
For companies, absolute network segregation is a way to protect the confidential data in some cases, 
but it will bring more inconvenience to the employees. Although, the majority of existing steganalyses 
(solutions) can be used to identify the corresponding steganography algorithms, the implementation 
of these solutions are not reliable in DLP systems due to the limitation of each steganalyses method 
and the diversity of steganography algorithms (this will be discussed in Section 3). Also, many images 
are normally sent in normal company network traffic. Therefore, an adaptive solution is necessary. 
This thesis examines spatial image steganography, and presents a novel approach to prevent the data 
loss threat, with the potential to be applied within industrial DLP systems. A research hypothesis is 
presented, which is that by slightly modifying the pixel values of spatial domain images, secret 
messages hidden inside cover images will be destroyed, while the quality of the image will be 
preserved. On the condition that there is no visible distortion of the image, two effective solutions are 
presented and verified. One is an adapted solution, called Presentation Domain Transform (PDT), 
which uses the irreversible JPEG compression procedure to affect the original pixels’ value. The other 
is a novel solution, named Chrominance Modification Algorithm (CMA), which performs random 
manipulations in the chrominance value to change the associated pixel value. In the second chapter, 
the literature will be reviewed. The methodology and implementation to prove the reliability and 
applicability of presented solutions are described in the third and fourth chapters respectively.  The 
evaluations of these solutions are compared to verify the most effective one in the fifth chapter. 
Finally, the conclusion and future work chapter complete this thesis.  
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1.2. Glossary 
Prior to reviewing the existence literature, the relevant terminologies will be explained in this sub-
section.  
Data Loss Prevention Systems 
In this thesis, Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is defined as a protection system that prevents potential data 
breaches [10]. 
Steganography  
Steganography is an ancient art for hiding secret messages under the carrier (cover). In this thesis, the 
secret message was hidden in digital images. The relevant hiding algorithms will be discussed in the 
next Literature Review section. 
Steganalysis 
Steganalysis is a reversing technique of steganography, which is used to prove the existence of a secret 
message in the cover image. The relevant detection methods will be introduced in the next Literature 
Review section. 
Least Significant Bit (LSB) 
The range of colour intensity which can be represented in 8-bit binary form is from 0 to 255. The LSB 
of a colour pixel is often defined as the 8th bit in the colour channel. As illustrated in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 4: The illustration of Least Significant Bit in the colour channel 
 
Most Significant Bits (MSB)  
The MSB is often defined as the 1st bit in the colour channel [11]. As illustrated in Figure 5 below: 
 
Figure 5: The illustration of Most Significant Bit in the colour channel 
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Robustness 
The quality of steganographic algorithms can be examined by three factors: robustness, embedding 
capacity and the visual quality in the steganographic image. Robustness is the ability of an algorithm 
to defend against systems that endeavour to examine the potential hidden data [12]. 
Histogram  
In this thesis, the histogram is used to examine the frequency of colour intensity in the target image, 
and this is called an image histogram. The distribution in an image histogram represents the amount 
of each colour value in the target image.  
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2. Literature Review 
Prior to presenting the solution in the thesis, the relevant literature was thoroughly researched and 
reviewed from three aspects; Data Loss Prevention, Steganography and Steganalysis.  
 
2.1. Data Loss Prevention 
Data loss prevention (DLP) is a protection system that prevents the occurrence of data breaches. It 
can also be seen as a strategy for making sure that confidential data cannot be transmitted out of the 
company network boundary by either an insider employee or outsider competitors [10], whether 
accidentally or maliciously. However, with the occurrence of increasing data breaches, computer 
security vendors have to develop correspondingly sophisticated protection software to govern these 
risks. Hence, the term DLP is also used to describe the software protection products that help the 
company to keep their confidential data under their control as well as out of the public domain. So 
far, there are a lot of security vendors that support the deployment of DLP systems. The top companies 
that provide this were ranked in “SelectHub” according to their popularity [13], as shown in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6: The ranking of top DLP vendors [13] 
 
Case Studies 
Although the protection systems are deployed within the enterprise, many data loss incidents still 
continually occur. As reported in many online articles, the most infamous data breaches in the UK 
have been listed [14], such as: 
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1. The “Three Mobile” event, 2016. [14] 
The customer upgrade database was accessed illegally using an employee’s login identification. 
Although the company announced the financial information was safe and was not accessed, the 
corresponding customer personal information was still at risk. 
2. The “Tesco Bank” event, 2016. [14] 
In early November, the British supermarket giant, Tesco, was subject to criminal activity, causing up 
to 40,000 customer’s data records to be compromised, and almost half of them had money stolen 
from their personal online bank account. Also, Tesco had to shut down all of their online banking 
operations; the customers could not perform any online transactions until the situation was under 
control.   
3. The “Sage” insider access event, 2016. [14] 
In Sage Group plc, a FTSE-100 firm in the UK, an insider illegally accessed a large volume of users’ data 
putting them at risk. This event will become one of the most important data breach cases in the UK’s 
history if the affected scale is confirmed. 
4. The “Mumsnet” event, 2014. [14] 
Mumsnet, one of the UK’s largest website for parents, suffered from the Heartbleed SSL attack due to 
software vulnerabilities. This allowed up to 1.5 million users’ data to be accessed freely by hackers. 
Although nothing was leaked that was financial, the reputation of the brand has been called into 
question. 
5. The “Sony PlayStation Network” event, 2011. [14] 
This damage was referred to as the largest data breach in history at the time, with almost 77 million 
users’ data affected. Incredibly, both personal details or transaction records were dropped (removed) 
from the database due to this outsider attack. The company’s system was offline for 23 days, and 
subsequently the influences and repercussions were felt worldwide.  
Data breaches are a very common phenomenon with the majority of companies having suffered this 
threat. Besides UK companies, these problems still exist in internationally well-known IT companies, 
even if they have good security groups within their company, such as Snapchat, Facebook, Apple. As 
the report has shown: 
1. Getting Scammed and Leaking Employee Data in Snapchat. [15] 
In 2016, their official blog identified employee information having been compromised, though the 
users’ data was safe. The main reason behind the compromise was from a phishing email that was 
presented as being sent by the CEO, but actually imitated by a hacker. Neither the security system, 
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nor the employees identified its non-authenticity. Afterwards, the employee data was completely 
exposed on a website. 
However, a similar data breach occurred in Snapchat before. In late 2013, due to system vulnerabilities 
caused by their security group, up to 4.6 million accounts had been disclosed and the data could be 
downloaded directly from SnapchatDB.info [16].  
2. Data breach - exposing 6 million users in Facebook. [17] 
As the giant of the world’s social networking, Facebook did not escape from having a data loss incident 
and being breached. The official announcement stated that almost 6 million users’ information was 
exposed to an unauthorized viewer due to system bugs in 2012. 
3. The infamous celebrity breach in Apple – iCloud hack 
In 2014, almost 500 private nude pictures of various celebrities were exposed from the iCloud server 
and disclosed on various websites. The security of cloud services has been called into question, 
bringing security to the forefront of everyone’s minds. 
Although Apple has denied the security breach, the verification procedures of iCloud were 
subsequently increased, and “two-step verification” checking has been activated to protect 
customers’ stored online data [18][19]. 
Consequently, data breaches frequently feature prominently in the news. No company seems to be 
immune to this phenomena, whether large or small. These malicious behaviours are normally caused 
by two vectors seen in the examples above; external attack and internal attack. The external attack 
vector is almost always implemented through exploiting the corresponding vulnerabilities, such as SQL 
injection, XSS, etc. Confidential data can be exposed completely to any unauthorized viewer once the 
relevant attack command has been injected.  
In addition, as the statistics from 2015 showed, around 84% of enterprises said that the most common 
attack experienced by their company is SQL injection [20]. However, with the constant upgrading of 
protection software such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), some vulnerabilities can be repaired 
or detected much more quickly. Compared with previous attack incidents, the attacks which involve 
exploiting system vulnerabilities have reduced appreciably. From the 2015 statistics, the common 
network attack types are now ‘flood attacks’ rather than based on attacking vulnerabilities, as shown 
in Figure 7 [22]: 
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Figure 7: The classification of network attacks in 2015.  
Source: McAfee Labs 2015 [22]. 
Nowadays, the greatest threat of data loss is that of an internal attack [2]. The malicious actors are 
often insider employees as data may be accessed from the company database either intentionally or 
unintentionally.  As reported by Ernst & Young, the corresponding malicious activities are given as 
examples [23]: 
- Unsuitable rights assigned to access confidential data. 
- Exploitation of limitations in the database’s development environment. 
- Betrayal of trust among developers. 
- Front office without supervision. 
- Employee discontent. 
- Trading secret information with insiders. 
For the cybersecurity teams in the enterprise, the preventative solutions are becoming increasingly 
challenged. Especially, with the rapid development of mobile devices, the data can be quickly accessed 
and extracted by physically removing a device, such as an iPhone or an iPad. Although flexibility has 
increased significantly, the loss risk has also increased proportionally. The laptop & mobile loss cases 
are also very frequent. In addition, with the increasing trend of cloud computing usage, the centralised 
storage that is referred to as cloud storage has been widely used by start-ups and medium enterprises 
alike resulting in data that is accessible everywhere which makes it much more difficult to track data 
storage and access within the enterprise [23]. To sum up the above challenges, the biggest trouble is 
that corporate data is not under their control. Prior to preventing data breaches effectively, the 
cybersecurity employee has to understand and identify the following fundamental questions [23]: 
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1. What is the data being protected? 
2. Where is the data? 
3. Where does the data need to go/never go? 
A Data Loss Prevention systems is an integrated defence system, which is implemented to prevent 
potential data breaches both internally and externally. With respect to the movement of enterprise 
data, this definition consists of three aspects: Data at Rest (resides in database, or other storage 
centres); Data at the Endpoint (resides at an external device, such as laptops, USB); and Data in Motion 
(communication traffic, such as email, P2P) [24]. 
Computer security companies, such as Symantec and McAfee, discuss the implementations of DLP 
systems and divide the work into three predominant processes: Discover, Monitor and Protect. The 
first step is to discover and locate where the company’s confidential data resides. The following 
process is to monitor how this data is being used, who is using it, and where it is going. Finally, the 
relevant permissions should be adjusted and corresponding policies set up to prevent any data loss 
[25] [26].  
With the expansion of enterprises, the complexity of managing traffic rises, especially due to the 
amount of endpoint devices which are constantly added to internal networks. Data loss becomes 
easier as an attacker can hide data within larger volumes of traffic in the network or in a higher 
frequency of resources requests, either in cloud or in database centres. Consequently, an effective 
DLP program should adopt appropriate comprehensive techniques to cover all of the organization’s 
potential loss models, rather than consider any single part only [27]. 
From the introduction in the Symantec DLP system white paper, the specific protection procedure is 
[25]: 
- Explore data in Content-Aware detection 
Exploiting a combination of advanced techniques to accurately detect the location of all of the 
confidential data, whether at rest, in motion, or in use, and also the type of data and file can be 
identified by using a vector machine learning method. 
- Monitor and Protect Cloud-Based Email and Storage.  
- Ensure the Security in Endpoints 
As both modules of endpoint discovery and prevention are enabled by a single scalable agent in the 
Symantec DLP system, the specific operation in the module is, for example, to perform a multi-tiered 
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local scan either in a laptop or in a desktop, and to monitor the real-time stream and notify the user 
with a pop-up window. 
- Ensure the Security in Mobile Devices (BYOD) 
Extending the monitoring and protection to all of your devices, the Mobile Email module is used to 
detect when confidential email is downloaded into mobile devices, also the Mobile Prevent module is 
used to monitor the transmission of confidential data via the native mail client, browser, and other 
apps. 
- Locate and Protect the Unstructured Data 
Unstructured data can be controlled through four essential DLP modules, such as Symantec DLP 
Network Discover, Network Protect, Data Insight and Data Insight Self-Service Portal. It is possible to 
implement the discovery, protection, and management of the confidential data across virtually any 
storage system. 
- Monitor and Protect the Data in Motion. 
A wide range of network protocols can be monitored and protected through three more network 
modules. These are Symantec DLP Network Monitor, Network Prevent for Email, and Network Prevent 
for Web.  
 
As demonstrated in the above procedure, DLP systems are an integrated defence system, designed 
and implemented by multiple function modules. Admittedly, confidential data loss is of utmost 
concern to the companies, DLP system offer products with a wide range of functionality and capability 
to protect the company’s data. However, none of these produces can detect insider use of 
steganography [69].  
Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security [68] indicated that globally, a worrying trend is that 
of using steganography to send the information over the Internet, and this has been done by some 
malwares already, such as Duqu. Not only companies, but countries have been the victim of 
steganographic loss. For example, in 2008, sensitive financial information was hidden inside JPEG 
images and sent out of US Department of Justice [68]. Hence, data loss and steganography have been 
the subject of concern by security researchers. 
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2.2. Steganography  
2.2.1. General Algorithms 
Prior to discussing the image steganography algorithms and steganalysis detections, the basic format 
of the digital image should be noted. Jessica Fridrich stated [28]: “Digital images are commonly 
represented in four basic formats – raster, palette, transform and vector”. The most popular images 
are based on raster, palette and transform, which represents BMP, PNG and JPEG respectively.  
The most common image steganography algorithm is the Least Significant Bit (LSB) method. However, 
during the long developmental history of steganography, this ‘war’ between the two sides 
(steganography and steganalysis) has been continuously progressing for the past decade. The 
embedding methods have evolved and upgraded while the detection method (steganalysis) has also 
been updated continually, such as LSB, ±1, JPEG, F3, F4 and F5 [67]. 
Although the algorithms have been classified and proposed in many formats, the categories based on 
their algorithms can be divided into two areas; the Spatial Domain and the Transform (Frequency) 
Domain.  In [29], the difference in the techniques between these two domains is explained. In spatial 
domain imagery, the message is embedded into the intensity of the pixel directly through replacing 
the LSB value with the cover image. In transform domain imagery, the message is embedded into the 
frequency table of the previously transformed image by using the same algorithm. Therefore, for these 
two algorithms, the spatial domain techniques change the pixel colour intensity value (RGB) to 
implement the message hiding; but in transform domain techniques, the frequency is altered rather 
than the intensity of colour.  
Whether steganographic techniques are in either the spatial domain or the transform domain, they 
have been improved and presented constantly in recent research papers. In this thesis, the research 
is focused on the spatial domain imagery as the transform domain imagery is more complicated, and 
can be analysed in future research.  
The most common algorithm in the spatial domain image is the LSB algorithm, which utilizes colour 
redundancy in the human eyes to replace the Least Significant Bits of pixel bytes where hidden data 
is stored in a cover image. With the updating of the algorithm, LSB can be classified into four areas 
[30]: LSB Replacement, LSB Matching, LSB matching revisited (LSBMR) and LSBMR-based edge-
adaptive (LSBMR-EA). However, LSBMR and LSBMR-EA belong to the extension of the LSBM algorithm 
in their classification as they are still very much related to LSB matching. Therefore, in this research, 
the LSB algorithm will be classified into two areas to be considered: LSB replacement and LSB matching.  
 
   pg. 27 
 
LSB Replacement Algorithm 
LSB replacement algorithm is also called as LSB embedding or LSB substitution algorithm. This 
algorithm conceals the data through replacing the LSBs of cover images with embedded message bits 
directly. As the illustration in Figure 8 shows:  
 
 
Figure 8: The illustration of LSB replacement algorithm (LSB 1) in the colour channel. 
The colour “Red” has the values [red: 254, green: 0, blue: 0] in an array; this is transformed into a 
binary code of [11111110, 00000000, 00000000]. The letter “a” is represented in binary by 
“01100001”. Thus, if the user wants to hide the message into the cover image where the background 
of this cover image is pure “Red”, the LSB 1 will take the last 1-bit from the colour array, and exchange 
it with the data values. The newly generated value could combine a new “Red” that is similar with the 
previous “Red”.  
(In this case, 3 pixels were picked1 for concealing the letter “a”. Before the embedding, they were, in 
binary [11111110, 00000000, 00000000], [11111110, 00000000, 00000000] and [11111110, 
00000000, 00000000]; in decimal [254, 0, 0], [254, 0, 0] and [254, 0, 0].  
After the embedding, they were updated to: in binary [11111110, 00000001, 00000001], [11111110, 
00000000, 00000000] and [11111110, 00000001, 00000000]; in decimal [254, 1, 1], [254, 0, 0] and 
[254, 1, 0].) 
                                                          
1 Because each pixel can conceal one character by using the LSB 1 algorithm and the letter consists of 8 
characters in binary, thus it requires 3 pixels to implement. 
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LSB Matching Algorithm 
Unlike the LSB replacement algorithm, LSB matching does not replace the message within the cover 
image directly. It embeds the data through comparing the confidential message with LSBs in the cover 
image first. If the message bit matches the LSB in the cover image, this pixel will stay the same. 
Otherwise, this pixel will be randomly either added or subtracted by 1 [30], as the illustration in Figure 
9 shows:  
 
Figure 9: The illustration of LSB matching in the colour channel 
Assume the colour “Red” has the values [red: 254, green: 1, blue: 1] in an array. This was transformed 
to a binary code of [11111110, 00000001, 00000001]. The letter “a” is “01100001” in binary.  If the 
user wants to hide the message in the cover image where the background of this cover image is a 
single colour, in this case Red in the LSB matching algorithm, the message data (binary bit) will be 
compared with the LSB of each pixel in the cover image first rather than being replaced with them 
directly. The pixel in the cover image was randomly incremented or decremented by 1 when the 
message bit is not the same as the corresponding LSB in the cover image. So, as the display of the 
above figure shows, only the fifth and sixth bits were modified (marked by the blue rectangles). The 
new generated values should have 4 possibilities, all of them could form a new “Red” that is similar 
with the previous Red as well. 
(In this case, 3 pixels were picked for concealing the letter “a”. The different fifth and sixth characters 
of message data corresponded with the Green and Blue colour channels in the second pixel of the 
cover image. It has 4 possibilities due to the randomness of the LSB matching algorithm. Therefore:  
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In Result 1: Green minus 1, Blue minus 1, the second pixel is, in binary [11111110, 00000000, 
0000000]; in decimal [254, 0, 0].  
In Result 2: Green plus 1, Blue plus 1, the second pixel is, in binary [11111110, 00000010, 00000010], 
in decimal [254, 3, 3].  
In Result 3: Green minus 1, Blue plus 1, the second pixel is, in binary [11111110, 00000000, 00000010]; 
in decimal [254, 0, 3].  
In Result 4: Green plus 1, Blue minus 1, this pixel is, in binary [11111110, 00000010, 00000000]; in 
decimal [254, 3, 0]). 
 
The extraction procedure of both algorithms 
During the process of extraction data, in the LSB replacement algorithm, the last n bit of each pixel 
will be chosen from the target image according to the specific stego-key (which includes the exchange 
bit and the location of exchanged pixel). Next, these single characters can be recombined into the 8-
bits binary codes, and the plaintext can be transformed from these binary codes.   
However, in the LSB matching algorithm, only the last bit of each pixel will be chosen from the target 
image due to their random manipulation during the embedding process. Then perform the same work 
flow as the replacement algorithm to recombine and transform the message from these picked bits. 
 
The difference between LSB replacement and LSB matching 
During the process of embedding data, in the LSB replacement algorithm, the data is replaced with 
the LSB of the cover image directly. Normally, the last bit of each colour channel in the cover image is 
used for concealing the message data, we called it “LSB 1” or “1-bit LSB”. However, with a constant 
increase in data size, the maximum bits available within “LSB 1” is occasionally not enough to hide all 
of the data. Generally, in order to digest large volumes of data, it is easier to utilize more colour bits 
to take part in the replacement, and this is called “LSB n”. The integer n can be determined by the 
sender according to the size of the message data and cover image (LSB 2, takes the last 2-bits; LSB 3, 
takes the last 3-bits; etc.). With an increasing n, the quality of the image will be degraded. As Figure 
10 conveys, the LSB 1 algorithm and the LSB 6 algorithm for hiding the same message on a cover image 
have very different results with the LSB 6 producing an image of a noticeably reduced quality.  
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Figure 10: The visual comparison between LSB 1 (left) and LSB 6 (right) 
In the LSB matching algorithm, only the last bit of the RGB pixel in the cover image will be changed 
only when the message bit does not match, also the changed result will match the message data 
completely whether by adding or subtracting 1 as there are only ‘0’ and ‘1’ in binary code. For example, 
if the pixel in the cover image is 11111110 (254), and the bit of the message is 1, using the LSB 
replacement algorithm, the message bit will be replaced with this pixel directly to obtain the new pixel 
value 11111111; the message is stored in the last bit in the pixel. In the LSB matching algorithm, this 
pixel will be added or subtracted by 1 randomly as the last bit of this pixel is ‘0’ which does not match 
with the message bit ‘1’. However, whether adding (the result of new pixel will be 11111111) or 
subtracting (the result of new pixel will be 11111101), the message will be stored in the last bit as well. 
From this example, in an LSB 1 replacement, all of the changed bits are based on: when even, add 1, 
and when odd, subtract 1. This regularised modification will make this algorithm easily recognised by 
histogram detection [31].  Instead, in the LSB matching algorithm, the random operations can make 
these new pixel values distributed more evenly in the histogram rather than using a set pattern. 
Notably, the LSB matching algorithm can only be used in the last bit of the RGB value in the cover 
image, otherwise the message data would not be stored in the cover image correctly. 
In the process of extracting the data, in the LSB replacement algorithm, the receiver needs a stego key 
which contains the value of replaced bit n and the length (size) of message bits (in binary form). The 
message can be extracted in binary form through this stego key, then the plaintext can be displayed 
after transforming into text form. However, in the LSB matching algorithm, the key consists of the 
length (size) of the message bits (in binary form) as only the last bit has changed during the embedding 
process, otherwise the extracted result will be unreadable. Finally, the message can be extracted in 
binary form directly according to the key’s length and the plaintext can be displayed after further 
conversion.  
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(NB: In these cases, the replaced / matched pixels start from the coordinate (0,0) in the cover image. 
Other situations are not considered as the key is required to import the location of changed pixels.) 
 
Evaluation (LSB replacement & LSB matching) 
Comparing these two algorithms, the LSB replacement algorithm has a greater embedding capacity, 
although the quality of image can be reduced with the increase of replaced bits n. The robustness is 
lower due to its constant modification (even add 1, odd subtract 1), the stego image can be identified 
by histogram detection, especially when the embedding message has a large volume size. During the 
extraction process, the stego key consists of two parameters. The length (size) of the binary message 
bit is an essential parameter; the second parameter is the value of replaced bits n, otherwise the 
extraction data will be unreadable.    
Instead, in the LSB matching algorithm, although it has lower space for concealing the message data 
as only the last bit can be used, the random manipulation (of pixel placement) can increase the 
robustness, so that the stego image cannot be identified easily even in histogram detection. Also 
during the extraction process, the stego key only needs to contain the length (size) of binary message 
bit.  
A summary of the difference and evaluation is shown in the Table 1: 
 Embedding Space  Robustness Stego Key 
LSB replacement Higher  Lower  N, Length of message 
LSB matching Lower Higher Length of message  
Table 1: The comparison of LSB replacement algorithm and LSB matching algorithm 
(NB: In this table, the “Higher” and “Lower” is only relative to each other) 
In the next sub-section, the relevant advanced algorithms, improvements in both the LSB replacement 
and the LSB matching will be introduced.  
 
2.2.2. Advanced Algorithms  
“FPGA Hardware of the LSB Steganography Method.”  By Mohd, Abed etc.[32] 
Firstly, three different measurement units were mentioned to measure the imperceptibility of 
Steganography, they were Mean Squared Error (MSE), Bit Error Rate (BER), and Peak Signal-to-Noise 
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Ratio (PSNR). A higher value of MSE indicates dissimilarity (difference) between the compared images. 
The value of PSNR indicates the quality of image, with a higher value indicating a better quality.  
Next, a new algorithm was proposed by Mohd et al, which is concealing confidential data in spatial 
domain images through manipulating the pixel bit values in the cover image. Unlike the LSB 
replacement algorithm, this algorithm is based on the combination of LSB 2 and LSB 3 rather than 
modifying the constant bit(s) in each colour channel. The data is embedded into the pixel with 2 bits 
in the red channel, 3 bits in the green channel and 3 bits in the blue channel. Thus, it is also called LSB 
2/3. The benefit of this algorithm is that a complete character can be embedded in each individual 
pixel. Also the measurement results of MSE and PSNR are between the LSB 2 and the LSB 3, there 
have: 
In MSE, LSB 2 < LSB 2/3 < LSB 3 
In PSNR, LSB 3 < LSB 2/3 < LSB 3. 
In the conclusion a set of images including the famous “Lena”, were tested with the LSB 2/3 algorithm 
to verify its performance. The resultant stego image not only has a good image quality, but also 
requires relatively lower memory for computation.  
 
“A Secure Image Steganography Based on RSA Algorithm and Hash-LSB Technique.”  By 
Kumar and Sharma [33] 
In order to enhance the security of steganography, a comprehensive method was proposed by Kumar 
and Sharma, which was a combination of cryptography and steganography. The authors 
recommended implementing the RSA algorithm and Hash-LSB technique at the same time.  
In their proposed system, the confidential data has to be converted to cipher text using the RSA 
algorithm to enhance the secrecy of the message before the embedding process, then the novel 
insertion technique Hash-LSB which is derived from the LSB replacement algorithm was implemented.  
In the Hash-LSB algorithm, the position of the LSB in the cover image for concealing the confidential 
data was determined through a hash function, as shown in the equation below. “Where K is the 
position of RGB within the pixel, p denotes the position of each hidden image pixel and n is the number 
of bits of LSB, which is 4 for this present case”.  
K = p % n 
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During the embedding process, the confidential data is converted into binary form. Each 8 bits of the 
message data is embedded in the LSB of the cover image pixel directly in the sequence of 3, 3 and 2 
independently (3 bits in red, 3 bits in green and 2 bits in blue) as “the chromatic influence of blue colour 
to the human eye is more than red and green colours”. Also, it means that each pixel can be embedded 
a complete character in binary form, as shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11: The illustration of Hash-LSB algorithm in the colour channel 
In this case, the sequence of 3, 3 and 2 was implemented to embed the message in the LSB of the RGB 
pixel respectively.  The position can be obtained from the above equation, the value of K = 1, 2, 3 in 
red channel, K =4, 1, 2 in Green channel, and K =3, 4 in Blue channel. Therefore, the 1-byte message 
data “11110101” was split to “111” in the Red channel with position 1,2,3; “011” in the Green channel 
with position 1,2,4; and “01” in the Blue channel with position 3,4. 
In the final part, they calculated and compared the results of PSNR and MSE between LSB with RSA 
and Hash LSB with RSA. The Hash LSB has a higher PSNR value and a significantly lower MSE, meaning 
that the stego image has a good quality and a small dissimilarity. 
 
“A proposed Method for Image Steganography using Edge Detection.”  By Arora and 
Anand[29] 
Arora and Anand proposed an alternative spatial domain embedding technique by implementing the 
image edge detection. The system model is divided into four phases: edge detection, randomization 
of edge pixels, embedding of confidential data and extracting confidential data.  
The embedding process is implemented in three steps. Firstly, the image edge will be detected through 
scanning in a 3 x 3 pixels window, the edge pixels are in an array (Array_Cover). Secondly, in order to 
enhance the security of steganography, the sorting approach is implemented to randomize these 
pixels in Array_Cover. Meanwhile, the confidential data is stored into another Array (Array_Message). 
Thirdly, according to the details of the Array_Message, the LSB replacement algorithm is executed 
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between the binary value of Array_Message and the blue component of Array_Cover, to generate a 
new Array (Array_Stego). The new stego image will be made from the Array_Stego. 
With this method, an advantage comes from utilising the principle of Image Edge Detection to increase 
the message embedding capacity in the cover image. As the edge areas are harder to detect changes 
than the smooth areas using human eyes only, this means that more data can be stored in the edge 
areas without increasing the possibility of image distortion.  However, the disadvantages are obvious 
as well, because in the extraction process, the receiver is required to possess a symmetric key for the 
randomization value for Array_Stego, otherwise, the replaced edges cannot be identified.  
 
“A Novel Approach for Data Hiding using LSB on Edges of a Grayscale Cover Images.” By 
Chaturvedi[34] 
A novel approach was proposed by Chaturvedi to conceal data in a Grayscale Cover Image through 
LSB replacement algorithm on Edge Detection, which is called EG-LSB. In order to extract edges, two 
parameter values (Mean and Standard Deviation) were used and they were assigned to the first two 
pixels in the cover image, and then using the edge detection algorithm all of the edge pixel values 
were obtained. Unlike Arora, S and Anand, S’ s algorithm [29], this method did not use the 
randomization method to locate the positions for embedding data. Instead, it utilised a horizontal 
scanning method, pixel by pixel to determine the positon of the edge areas. The LSB 2 algorithm will 
be implemented in this pixel once its edge value is ‘1’. Moreover, the embedding process was not 
started at the first point as the first two pixels were reserved to hide the information of these 
parameters, Mean and Standard deviation. Otherwise, during the data extraction process, the receiver 
cannot obtain the same edge array to extract the message.  
As shown in the following pseudocode:  
(Assuming the size of cover image is M * N, the value of i and j indicate the current coordinate value 
of pixel. 0 <= i <=M, 0 <= j <= N) 
for i = 1; i < = M; i ++ 
    for j = 1; j <= N; j ++ 
        if (Edge (Cover Image (i, j)) == 1) 
   execute LSB 2 in cover image (i, j)  
    end 
end 
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Thus, in the EG-LSB algorithm, all of the first row and the first column pixels are reserved and the rest 
of pixels is used to embed the secret data, each 2 bits of data is replaced by 2 bits in the LSB of the 
cover image if this pixel is identified in the edge areas. 
In their conclusion, the comparison between the EG-LSB algorithm and the LSB replacement algorithm 
was evaluated, and the measurement unit PSNR was set to a reference to verify the newly generated 
stego image. As the experimental results proved, the quality of images using EG-LSB is better than the 
LSB, although the value of PSNR has a slight increase. 
 
“A steganography method for images by pixel-value differencing.” By Wu and Tsai [35] 
There are various ways to determine the areas of edges and smoothness in the images. Besides the 
several regular edge detection algorithms, the method of Pixel Value Differencing (PVD) is a good 
mechanism to distinguish these parameters as well. This was first proposed in 2002. 
Wu and Tsai proposed a new steganographic method for grayscale images using Pixel Value 
Differencing. In a grayscale image, each pixel contains 8 bits grey-values, totalling 256 grey-values 
which indicates the colour from 0 (Dark) to 255 (White). In the PVD method, the cover image will be 
split into a number of non-overlapping two-pixel blocks. Then, these blocks will be categorized 
according to the difference of the two pixel values. A higher difference value indicates this block is 
located in the edge areas, whereas a lower difference value indicates the area is smooth. In this 
method, the same principle was used to conceal the data as mentioned in [29], the tolerance in the 
edge parts is more than smooth parts, thus, more data will be embedded into the edge areas. 
During the embedding process, the pixels in the cover image will be scanned in a “zigzag” manner, 
and split into non-overlapping two-pixel blocks. The difference d can be computed from two 
consecutive pixels in each block. Assume those two pixels are 𝑝𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖+1, and the value of these pixels 
are 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖+1. So, d = |𝑔𝑖+1. - 𝑔𝑖|.  Using the value of d to classify boundaries into a number of 
contiguous ranges, the value of the lower bound 𝑙𝑖and the value of upper 𝑢𝑖can be obtained according 
to their Difference Range Table. Next, the number of bits n which is going to be embedded in this block 
is calculated by the equation n = log2 (𝑢𝑖 - 𝑙𝑖 +1). The n bit(s) data is taken from the secret data and 
converted into a decimal format. A new difference d’ is calculated from the value of d and 𝑙𝑖. Finally, 
the new grayscale pixel can be obtained through a new function which works on the new difference 
value d’. The stego image can be generated from these new pixel values in the cover image.  
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In conclusion, Wu and Tsai listed the different experimental results which was based on the different 
ranges width. The stego image not only has a very good result in both PSNR and MSE, but also can 
escape the detection from some advanced steganalysis methods, such as the RS attack detection [47].  
 
“Colour Image Steganography Based on Pixel Value Differencing in Spatial Domain.” By 
Mandal and Das [36] 
Subsequently, various image steganography approaches which are based on the PVD method have 
been proposed. In 2012, the authors used the PVD algorithm on a spatial domain colour image. Unlike 
the algorithm in [35], the pixel value is separated and stored into three different colour matrixes: Red 
matrix, Green matrix and Blue matrix. Each block’s pixel is stored related to each colour matrix 
respectively, from the beginning until the end. The value of difference d is computed for each block of 
two consecutive non-overlapping pixels, assume the pixels are 𝑝𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖+1, d = |𝑝𝑖  – 𝑝𝑖+1|. Then, the 
optimal range 𝑅𝑖  can be obtained through their Difference Range Table 2 , and the amount of 
confidential data ‘n’ which will be embedded into the cover image is computed.  
Also, the data is not embedded into all of the blocks in this method, the different thresholds are set 
for each colour matrix as the reference. Next, the value of n in each colour matrix is used to determine 
whether the message data can be embedded in this block through comparison with the related 
references. Such as: In the Red matrix, if n <= 5,3 then execute the next step, otherwise, no data will 
be embedded in this block. In the Green matrix, if n <=3, execute the next step, otherwise, no data 
will be embedded in this block. However, in the Blue matrix, whatever the n’s value is, execute the 
next step directly. The pseudo code was shown in below: 
In Red: 
If n <= 5 
  LSBfunction(); 
In Green: 
If n <= 3 
  LSBfunction(); 
In Blue: 
 LSBfunction(); 
                                                          
2 as same as the previous Difference Range Table in paper [12]. 
3 The authors defined the reference value 5 in the red matrix, and 3 in the green matrix. 
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Here, pick n bit(s) of data from the secret data and convert them into a decimal value b. The new 
difference value d’ can be computed from the equation: d’ = 𝑙𝑖 + b, also the new pixel (𝑝𝑖′, 𝑝𝑖+1′) (after 
the data embedding) can be generated through the function of the original PVD method. The previous 
pixel (𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑖+1) is replaced by this new pixel (𝑝𝑖′, 𝑝𝑖+1′) and will generate a new block. In the final step, 
in order to keep the information whether n bits or n-1 bits have been embedded, the relevant add or 
subtract operation is executed from the value of LSB in 𝑝𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖+1, which then generates the new 
stego-image. 
In the final part of this paper, the evaluation of this algorithm was presented which compared the 
original PVD method and this method through calculating the value of PSNR. In this method, although 
the algorithm can be executed for both the grayscale images and colour images, the value of PSNR has 
a trivial decrease. 
 
“Colour Image Steganography based on Pixel Value Modification Method Using Modulus 
Function.”  By Nagaraj, Vijayalakshmi and Zayaraz [37] 
One more colour image steganographic algorithm was proposed in 2013, which was based on using a 
modulus function to implement the method of Pixel Value Modification (PVM). Unlike other 
steganography algorithms, the confidential data is not converted to binary form in this case. Also, the 
value of the cover image pixel can be implemented the embedding process in decimal from directly 
without any conversions. 
During the process of embedding the data, the cover image is separated into three different colour 
matrices to store the related colour pixels, from the first to the last. The confidential data is converted 
into base 3 with values of (0, 1 ,2) rather than in binary form; it is called d.  Then, all the values within 
the different colour matrices execute the function modulo 3, and the result is recorded as, say, f. Next, 
the value of f and d is used to evolve a new value of this pixel.  For example, in the red colour matrix, 
assume the value of this pixel is 𝑃𝑟, if f = d, 𝑃𝑡 will stay the same value as previously. If f < d, Pr will 
increase by 1 to obtain the new value 𝑃𝑟′; if f > d, the new value 𝑃𝑟′  can be generated through 
decreasing by 1. Other colour matrixes follow the same rules to obtain the new value through 
modifying the pervious value. Finally, the new pixel can be combined from those matrices, to generate 
a stego-image.   
As shown in Figure 12, converting the secret data d into base 3 gives the value of “10212….”. The value 
of an individual pixel is, R: 226, G: 137, B: 126. Using the modulus function to calculate the result of f 
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respectively, then combining the result (0,2,1) with the converted secret data d (in this example only 
the top three values were used, 1, 0, 2) and the result is the new pixel, R:226, G:136, B:127. 
 
Figure 12: The illustration of PVM algorithm in the embedding procedure [37] 
During the procedure of data extraction, the data can be extracted directly using modulo 3 in the value 
of each colour channel. As shows in Figure 13, the data (1, 0, 2) can be calculated through modulus 3 
directly from the new value, R:226, G:136, B 127. 
 
Figure 13: The illustration of PVM algorithm in the extraction procedure [37] 
The evaluation was listed comparing both the values of Payload (embedded capacity) and PSNR with 
the original PVD. This method has an outstanding quality and capacity, but also has an efficient 
computation time as the procedure of the conversion of the binary form in cover image has been 
eliminated.   
 
“A Novel Image Steganography Method with Adaptive Number of LSB Modification Based 
on Private Stego-Keys.” By Jain and Ahirwal [38] 
A novel LSB substitution algorithm based on the utilization of private keys was proposed for grayscale 
images. In this method two private keys were mentioned; the first key (𝐾1 ) is used in both the 
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procedures of the data embedding and extraction, and the second key (𝐾2) is used to verify the 
integrity of the confidential data for the receiver.  
Firstly, the private 𝐾1 consists of five different grey value ranges that are selected from the range 0 ~ 
255 randomly, say 𝐾1:< 𝑆1 – 𝐸1, 𝑆2 – 𝐸2, 𝑆3 – 𝐸3, 𝑆4– 𝐸4, 𝑆5– 𝐸5 >. Where, 𝑆1 indicates the first range 
of the start value; 𝐸1indicates the first range of the end value. The difference D can be obtained by 
equation: D = 𝐸𝑖– 𝑆𝑖 (1 <= i <=5).  The value of D is a reference to confirm the correctness in each 
range, because the difference of two consecutive ranges cannot be less than 32, also anyone range 
cannot overlap others. 
Next, n bits of the secret data can be determined for insertion into each pixel. Firstly, according to the 
details of 𝐾1 , the related number of pixels can be counted in each range from the cover image, 
denoted by <𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁3, 𝑁4, 𝑁5>. Then by sorting by value, the largest range can have 5 bits of data 
replaced, the second largest can be embedded in 4 bits data and so on.  
For example, assume the counting of pixel in each range is < 𝑁1= 250, 𝑁2= 430, 𝑁3= 90, 𝑁4 = 3500, 𝑁5 
= 100 >, then after sorting these ranges, the order is: 𝑁4 > 𝑁2> 𝑁1> 𝑁5 > 𝑁3. Therefore, the first range 
𝑆1 – 𝐸1 can replace 3 bits of the message data in the pixel, the second range 𝑆2 – 𝐸2 is 4 bits, the third 
range 𝑆3 – 𝐸3 is 1 bit, the fourth range 𝑆4– 𝐸4 is 5 bits and the fifth range 𝑆5– 𝐸5 is 2 bits. 
The LSB substitution algorithm will be executed subsequently, the related bit(s) will be replaced with 
message data in each pixel. However, the newly generated pixel has to meet one of these ranges, 
meaning that the new value cannot exceed the boundary (end value) of the range, otherwise, one 
more adjusting algorithms will be used for modifying the value to fall within the range. 
Finally, the signature 𝐾2 is confirmed to verify the integrity of the message through a simple XOR 
method with a random key of 140 bits, and this is appended with the message. 
In conclusion, the evaluation of this method was listed through comparison with other algorithms, 
such as LSB 4 and other adaptive methods. In the grayscale image, their proposed method not only 
has a superb image quality with the highest PSNR value, but it also has the largest embedding capacity 
than all the others. However, the major drawback is the security issue that occurs from the 
transmission of both private keys.    
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“Adaptive data hiding in edge areas of image with spatial LSB domain systems.” By Yang, 
Weng, Wang and Sun [39] 
A derived algorithm from the original PVD method was implemented for concealing data in edge areas. 
In this method, the Pixel Value Differences are still used to determine the position of edge areas and 
smooth areas. Three levels are defined to identify the different ranges, the Lower level, the Middle 
level and the Higher level. The LSB substitution algorithm is executed on all of two consecutive pixels; 
the value of a replaced bit n is subject to the classification of the level as a higher level can be 
embedded with more characters. 
The colour intensity range [0, 255] is divided into two different categories, which are called lower-
higher (l-h) level and lower-middle-higher (l-m-h) level, as shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14: The description of l-h level and l-m-h level 
Hence, under  l-h level, 𝑅1 ∈ [0, 15], 𝑅2 ∈ [16, 255]; under l-m-h level, 𝑅1 ∈ [0, 15], 𝑅2 ∈ [16, 31], 𝑅3 ∈ 
[32, 255]. The length of range |R| can be obtained, for example, in l-h level, |𝑅1| = 16, |𝑅2|= 240. 
Then, the value of replaced bit n can be calculated by the below equation:  
n ≤ 𝑙𝑜𝑔2|𝑅| 
For each different level, the number of n has a different result. In l-h level, 𝑛1 = 4, 𝑛2 = 7. In l-m-h level, 
𝑛1 =4, 𝑛2 =4 and 𝑛3 =7. In the last step, in order to avoid the distortion in a stego image, the adjusting 
phase is executed to reduce the value of this n. Finally,  in the division of l-h level, 𝑛1 = 2, 𝑛2 = 3. In the 
division of l-m-h level, 𝑛1 =3, 𝑛2 =4 and 𝑛3 =5. 
During the embedding procedure, every two non-overlapping pixels are scanned in a raster way 
(horizontal direction scanning) from the cover image, all of the pairs of pixels are stored into different 
blocks, and the differences d in these blocks can be gathered. Next, all of the blocks are defined into 
relative levels due to the value of d, and the number of replaced bits n can be confirmed for each pixel. 
By using the LSB substitution algorithm, to pick the corresponding n bit data from the message, and 
replacing it with the cover image to generate the new block. The new pixel difference d’ in this new 
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block must belong to the same level with previous difference d in the division. Otherwise, an adjusting 
algorithm will be executed to alter the new block to fall within the previous level, then the stego image 
can be generated from all of these new blocks.  
In their conclusion, the quality of the stego-images was evaluated through the comparison of PSNR 
that is based on the variable n. As their report showed, with a decrease in the value n, the result of 
PSNR rises significantly. In the division of l-h level, the best image quality is when 𝑛1=2 and 𝑛2=4 
(represent by 2-4). Also, the results in the original PVD, l-m-h division (3-4-5) and l-h division (3-4) were 
compared, the quality of stego-image is in the sequence: l-h > l-m-g > PVD. 
 
“Image Data Hiding Method Based on Multi-Pixel Differencing and LSB substitution 
Methods.” By Jung, Ha and Yoo [40] 
In 2008, one more derived algorithms from the original PVD method was proposed by Jung, Ha, and 
Yoo, which was based on the combination of the optimized Multi-Pixel Differencing (MPD) and LSB 
replacement methods. Unlike previous Pixel-Differences algorithms, in this method, the blocks are 
collected into groups of four consecutive non-overlapping pixels from the grayscale cover image, and 
the pixel value is sorted from the lowest to the highest. Assume a block consists of pixels with 𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑖+1, 
𝑝𝑖+2, and 𝑝𝑖+3, the grey value of them are 𝑔0, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 and 𝑔3 respectively, also the sequence is 𝑔3 > 𝑔2 
> 𝑔1 > 𝑔0. 
During the embedding procedure, the differences d in each pixel-pair of four consecutive non-
overlapping pixels are computed first, as shown in equation below: 
𝑑𝑖   = | 𝑔𝑖  - 𝑔0|,  Where i ∈ [1, 2] 
In the second step, the areas between edge and smooth will be categorized through comparing the 
sum of differences D in the block with a defined threshold. Where the sum D = 𝑑1 + 𝑑2+ 𝑑3, and the 
threshold value is set at T.4 If D < T, then this block is in the smooth areas, otherwise, it is defined in 
the edge areas.  
Next, the n bits of confidential data can be confirmed to be embedded into 𝑔𝑖  by using the LSB 
replacement algorithm, where i ∈ [1, 2]. Two cases should be considered:  
                                                          
4 The Author defined this threshold value, which is 6. 
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- Case 1: if this block is located in the smooth areas, pick 9 bits of data from the confidential 
message, also execute LSB 3 algorithm to replace the corresponding pixel in the cover image, 
and generate a new block. 
- Case 2: if this block is defined in the edge areas, the number of n can be computed with a 
defined range Table5 by equation: n = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑙𝑖 + 1). u indicates the upper bound, and i 
denotes the lower bound.  
Then, the value of new difference d’ can be computed by equation: 𝑑𝑖’ = 𝑑𝑖   + 𝑏𝑖  for each 𝑔𝑖, where 
𝑏𝑖  is the decimal value for the embedded confidential message bits, and i ∈ [1, 2]. Finally, the optimize 
function is executed in the edge block, and then a new block will be obtained, and the stego-image 
can be generated from these new blocks.  
In the conclusion, this algorithm was evaluated through comparing the value of PSNR and embedded 
capacity with the LSB 2, original PVD and MPD. As the report showed, the largest embedding capacity 
is in their optimized algorithm, although the PSNR is the lowest in all four of them. 
 
“Image Steganography using Pixel-Value Differencing.” By Hanling, Guangzhi and Caiqiong [41] 
In 2009, another algorithm based on Pixel Value Differencing steganography method was presented 
by Hanling, Guangzhi and Caiqiong. The amount of the insertion bits refers to the depth distribution 
of the cover image, the message data in the edge area can be concealed more than in the smooth 
areas. However, unlike the other PVD methods, this method is only modifying one target pixel for each 
block rather than all of the pixels. 
During the embedding procedure, the pixel blocks are gathered by using raster-scan in the cover 
image, each block consists of four non-overlapping pixels, one target pixel and three neighbouring 
pixels. 
 
Figure 15: The illustration of pixel blocks 
                                                          
5 The Author also defined this range Table, where 𝑅1[0, 7], 𝑅2[8, 15], 𝑅3[16, 31], 𝑅4[32, 63], 𝑅5[64, 127] and 
𝑅6[128, 255].  
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Therefore, assume, in this block, the four pixels are 𝑝𝑡  (target pixel), 𝑝𝑢 (the upper of 𝑝𝑡), 𝑝𝑙  (the left 
of 𝑝𝑡), and 𝑝𝑙𝑢 (the upper-left of 𝑝𝑡) as shown in the Figure 15 above. The corresponding grey values 
are denoted as 𝑔𝑡, 𝑔𝑢, 𝑔𝑙  and 𝑔𝑙𝑢 respectively. Next, the differences d between the Maximum and 
Minimum in this block can be computed through the equation below: 
d = Max(𝑔𝑢, 𝑔𝑙, 𝑔𝑙𝑢) - Min(𝑔𝑢, 𝑔𝑙, 𝑔𝑙𝑢) 
then, the amount of insertion bits ‘n’ can be obtained from the value of d, as shows in formula below: 
If d ∈ [0, 1], n = 1 
If d ∈ (1, +), n = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2d 
In order to avoid the distortion in the stego images, n will be set 4 when the value of 𝑙𝑜𝑔2d > 4; picking 
the corresponding n bits from confidential data and converting them to decimal form, denoted in b. 
Then, the new pixel 𝑔𝑡’ can be calculated by the equation: 
𝑔𝑡’ = 𝑔𝑡 - 𝑔𝑡mod 2
𝑛 + b 
Finally, before generating the stego-image, in order to reduce the Embedding Error between 𝑔𝑡  and 
𝑔𝑡 ’ within a defined range6, an optimal adjustment process will be executed to alter the newly 
generated pixel.  
In their conclusion, the evaluation of this method was compared with Chang’s [61] method and Park’s 
[62] method respectively through calculating the PSNR and Embedding Capacity. This novel method 
not only has a highest PSNR, but can also embed the most data out of the three techniques.  
 
“High payload steganography mechanism using hybrid edge detector.” By Chen, Chang and 
Le [42] 
The hybrid edge detection mechanism was presented to locate the position of edge areas and be used 
with the LSB replacement algorithm to conceal secret data in the grayscale image. The authors 
implemented the relevant edge detection experiment based on three different detection algorithms, 
such as Fuzzy Edge Detector, Canny Edge Detector and Hybrid Edge Detector. Through comparing the 
amount of edge pixels to state the reason of using hybrid detection to conceal data, as in the edge 
transforming rates, the order was denoted as Hybrid > Canny > Fuzzy.    
During the embedding procedure, there are three phases:  
                                                          
6 The author defined this range to (-2𝑛 < 𝑔
𝑡
< 2𝑛 ). 
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- Phase 1: using a hybrid detection algorithm to generate an edge image from the original 
grayscale cover image.  
- Phase 2: dividing the edge image into a set of blocks, and assume each block contains N pixels, 
from 𝑝1to 𝑝𝑁. Also, in each block, the first pixel (𝑝1) is used to store the edge information of remaining 
pixels (besides 𝑝1) in this block by using the LSB replacement algorithm.  
For instance, assume a block contains four pixels, A =[𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4], where N =4. If 𝑝2 and 𝑝4 are both 
located in edge areas only, the edge information (besides 𝑝1)  is defined to “101”. Then this value ‘101’ 
will be replaced into 𝑝1 through the LSB substitution algorithm. Generally, in order to increase the 
embedding capacity and protect the quality of stego image, the N is suggested to be set as [3,5].  
- Phase 3: according to the edge information, the replaced bit n can be considered respectively, 
as the edge areas can be embedded more data than smooth areas in the image.  However, in order to 
avoid causing the distortion in the stego image, the n is set to [3,5] in edge areas and [1,2] in smooth 
areas. Then, the corresponding n bits LSB replacement algorithm will be executed in the remaining 
pixel (beside 𝑝1) for each block, if the pixel is located in the edge areas, the range of n will be picked 
as [3,5], otherwise, [1,2] will be chosen. 
In their conclusion, the comparison between this method and original LSB replacement method was 
evaluated, the proposed method has a higher Embedding Capacity and better PSNR value. Especially 
in the original LSB replacement algorithm, the stego image has an appreciable distortion since the 
replaced bits n is up to 5 or 6. However, for the proposed method, the quality of stego image is kept 
consistent, even if the value of replaced bit n is up to 5 in edge areas. Also, the evaluation showed that 
n was optimal on [3,5] in edge area, [1,2] in smooth area. Otherwise, the stego image will be caused 
perceptible distortion. 
 
“A New LSB Matching Steganographic Method Based on Steganographic Information 
Table.” By Qiudong and Liu [43] 
A novel LSB matching algorithm based on Steganographic information table was presented. In the 
beginning of this paper, the limitations of LSB Matching algorithm were analysed, although the LSB 
matching has a higher robustness in human visual detection and its histogram change is more 
imperceptible than the result of the LSB replacement algorithm. The histogram of the stego image is 
still distorted from the cover image if the embedding rate is too high a value, and the peak value has 
a significant smoothness over the cover image.  In this proposed method, the previous limitation of 
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LSB matching algorithm is improved by using a steganographic information table to reserve all of the 
histogram characters. 
In the original LSB matching algorithm, the resultant differential noise between the cover image and 
stego image has an obvious ‘ragged’ distribution in the histogram, as shown from the paper’s Figure 
16 [43], 
 
Figure 16: The noise difference histogram between the original cover image and the stego image (without 
table)  [43] 
In order to generate a stable noise histogram between the cover image and the stego image as much 
as possible, the ‘Steganographic information record table’ was presented to record the result of pixel 
changes during the algorithm embedding procedure. In this table, all operations where the pixel was 
changed would be recorded dynamically step by step. The table will be accomplished after all of the 
confidential data are embedded into the cover image.  
In this proposed method, during the embedding procedure, if the bit of message is equal to the LSB 
of the cover image, this pixel will stay the same in the cover image. Otherwise, it will be added or 
subtracted by one according to the resultant differential noise in the ‘Steganographic information 
record table’, which guarantees to reduce the difference of noise histogram to the lowest in each time 
operation.  
In the conclusion, the noise histogram result between original LSB matching and new improved 
proposed method was compared, as shown in Figure 17.  Although the proposed method has a 
negligible difference between the cover image and stego image, the computation time is very large as 
the steganographic information table has to update constantly in each time injection operation during 
the embedding procedure.  
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Figure 17: The noise different histogram comparison between without (top) and with (down) the presented 
stego table [43] 
 
“LSB Matching Revisited.” By Mielikainen [44] 
For the LSB matching algorithm, there are only a few detections proposed before 2006. However, in 
order to improve the original LSB matching algorithm for increasing the robustness in these 
detections, a new matching method based on two pixels at a time was presented which updated the 
original LSB matching algorithm.  
The new method is used in the grayscale image. During the insertion procedure, the minimum unit is 
a pair of bits either in the cover image (two pixels) or the confidential data (two bits), and which would 
be picked to execute relevant operations each time in the embedding operation. Also, this new 
embedding algorithm cannot be embedded on saturated pixels, such as when the value is 255, or 0, 
which is the same as the original LSB matching algorithm. The specific operation is shown by the below 
pseudocode:    
NB: two confidential message data denoted as 𝑀𝑖and 𝑀𝑖+1; two cover image pixels are referred as to  
𝑝𝑖  and 𝑝𝑖+1. 𝑝𝑖′  and 𝑝𝑖+1
′ indicate the new pixel value in the stego-image. Also, the function F (𝑝𝑖  ,  
𝑝𝑖+1) can be evolved by the equation below:   
F (𝑝𝑖  ,  𝑝𝑖+1) = LSB(⌊
𝑝𝑖
2
⌋ + 𝑝𝑖+1) 
(NB: ⌊….⌋ indicates the largest integer less or equal to the value that is in these two brackets.) 
if  𝑀𝑖 = 𝐿𝑆𝐵(𝑝𝑖) 
 if  𝑀𝑖+1 ! = 𝐹(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖+1) 
  𝑝𝑖+1
′  =  𝑝𝑖+1 ± 1 
 else 
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  𝑝𝑖+1
′  =  𝑝𝑖+1  
end 
𝑝𝑖
′ =  𝑝𝑖 - 1 
else 
 if 𝑀𝑖+1 ! = F ( 𝑝𝑖 – 1,  𝑝𝑖+1) 
  𝑝𝑖
′ =  𝑝𝑖 - 1 
 else 
  𝑝𝑖
′ =  𝑝𝑖 + 1 
 end 
𝑝𝑖+1
′  =  𝑝𝑖+1 
end 
In their conclusion, the robustness was compared between the original LSB matching algorithm and 
this proposed method through implementing the relevant LSB matching detection in both algorithms 
with 1,000 images. As the result shows, this new method has a relatively lower probability of detection 
curve, as shown in Figure 18: 
 
Figure 18: The resistance results comparison between the LSB matching and new proposed method [44] 
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“A Generalization of LSB Matching.” By Yang, Cheng and Zeng [31] 
A novel LSB matching algorithm that generalized the LSB matching and LSB matching revisits was first 
proposed in 2008, and called the generalised LSB matching scheme (G-LSB-M). Also, in this paper, the 
concept of the Expected Number of Modification Per Pixel (ENMPP) has been proposed to identify the 
resistance in relevant steganalysis. As shown in Figure 19: 
 
Figure 19: The equation of Expected Number of Modifications Per Pixel [31] 
The embedding procedure was compared in the G-LSB-M with other algorithms. In the original LSB 
matching algorithm, the pixel can be added or subtracted randomly by one while the message data 
does not match with this pixel. The considered unit is every single pixel, and the value of ENMPP is 
0.5.7 
However, in the LSB matching revisits algorithm, each time the embedding picks two bits of the 
message data, it compares them with two LSB pixels in the cover image; the operation on the pixel, 
whether added or subtracted, depends on the algorithm’s regulation table. Thus, the implementation 
units are up to a pair either in the cover image or in the secret message; the value of ENMPP is 
decreased to 0.375.  
In this new G-LSB-M algorithm, the value of ENMPP was reduced again through increasing the 
consideration unit, which extended up to 3. Three bits are embedded in a ternary pixel array, the 
relevant operations of each pixel, whether added or subtracted, depends on its algorithm regulation 
function as well. The value of ENMPP was verified to be 1/3. Therefore, the new method G-LSB-M can 
generate a more secure stego image with a higher robustness for detection through reducing the value 
of ENMPP. 
In their conclusion, the resistance is verified through implementing 5000 images in different LSB 
matching detections. As the experiment showed, the G-LSB-M algorithm has a lower probability of 
positive detection especially with the value of consideration unit (both in the cover image and the 
secret image) increasing, the value of probability of detection will be reduced. This is shown in Figure 
20: 
                                                          
7 This value was computed by author in his paper, as well as the 0.375 in LSB matching revisits algorithm. 
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Figure 20: The resistance result comparison in LSB matching and variable n in G-LSB-M [31] 
(NB: in this Figure 20, the n indicates the value of the considered unit) 
 
“Lossless Data Hiding Scheme Based on LSB Matching.” By Quan and Zhang [45] 
In 2013, another simple reversible LSB matching algorithm was proposed through implementing the 
concept of parity feature to a pair subset in the cover image. This new algorithm not only can be 
applied with a lower implementation complexity, but also can be executed in multiple cover files, such 
as image, video and audio.  
Prior to discussing the embedding procedure, a secret key K was defined, and it will be shared between 
the sender and receiver for the process of data extraction. The cover image can be divided into two 
equal subsets (A and B) due to the information in K. In the subset A, the corresponding embedding 
message pair is defined as (2k, 2k+1). Instead, the corresponding message pair is defined as (2k-1, 2k) 
in the subset B.  
During the embedding procedure, the pixel can only be modified when the message bit does not 
match (equal) the LSB of cover image. The relevant operation whether added or subtracted is 
considered by the position of this pixel. If the pixel is in the subset A, the odd pixel value 2k +1 is 
decreased by one, and the even pixel 2k is increased by one. Instead, in the subset B, the odd pixel 
value 2k -1 is increased by one and the even pixel value 2k is decreased by one, as shown in the 
pseudocodes below: 
(Assume: 𝑀𝑖 indicates the embedding message bit; 𝑝𝑖   indicates the value of target pixel; 𝑝𝑖′  indicates 
the value of stego-image pixel) 
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if 𝑀𝑖 != LSB (𝑝𝑖)  
    if 𝑀𝑖 = 1 
        if 𝑝𝑖 A (subset) 
            𝑝𝑖’ = 𝑝𝑖 + 1 
        else 
            𝑝𝑖’ = 𝑝𝑖 - 1 
    else 
        if 𝑝𝑖 A (subset) 
            𝑝𝑖’ = 𝑝𝑖 - 1 
        else 
            𝑝𝑖’ = 𝑝𝑖 + 1 
end 
The resistance and quality were compared between this algorithm and the generalized LSB matching 
algorithm. As the experiment result displayed, the proposed algorithm has a higher quality in the 
stego-image as the value of PSNR and MSE are stable around 51.45 and 0.5 respectively. Moreover, 
for this new algorithm, the resistance in RS detection (RS detection will be explained later) has a 
significant increase, only with a quite low probability of detection.  
 
2.2.3. Summary of Spatial Domain Image Steganography  
According to the explanation of the algorithms above, a summary was concluded as below: 
Algorithm 
Name 
Principle Benefits Drawbacks Author 
LSB 2/3 
Red channel exchanges 2 
bits, Green and Blue channel 
exchange 3 bits separately. 
Good quality in stego 
image, and lower 
memory for 
computation during 
the embedding 
procedure. 
Only work on 
colour image 
Mode, Abed 
et al. 
Hash-LSB 
Message is encrypted, then 
perform hash function to 
identify the exchange bits in 
each colour channel. 
Stego image has good 
quality and small 
dissimilarity. Message 
is more secure as 
encrypted by RSA. 
Only work on 
colour image. 
Kumar and 
Sharma. 
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Randomization 
edge detection 
Use edge detection to sort 
the edge pixels through 3 * 3 
pixels windows, randomize 
these pixels and perform LSB 
algorithm 
More data can be 
stored in edge areas 
without image 
distortion, edge areas 
are harder to be 
detected than the 
smooth areas. 
A symmetric 
key is required 
in the 
extraction, as 
the edge 
pixels were 
randomized. 
Arora and 
Anand. 
EG-LSB 
Identify edge pixel by using 
horizontal scanning method, 
perform LSB 2 in edge pixels, 
reserve first two pixels to 
store the Mean and Standard 
Deviation. 
Good image quality in 
stego image, and the 
measurement unit 
PSNR is better than 
LSB replacement 
algorithm. 
 Chaturvedi. 
Pixel Value 
Difference. 
(PVD) 
The image is split into a 
number of non-overlapping 
two-pixel blocks, according 
to the difference value in 
each block, to identify the 
exchange bit. 
Very good 
measurement unit 
result in both PSNR 
and MSR, even the 
stgeo image can 
escape the detection 
of RS attack. 
Only works on 
grayscale 
image. 
Wu and Tsai. 
Colour Pixel 
Value 
Differencing. 
The same as PVD, but the 
pixel value is separated and 
stored into three different 
colour matrixes (RGB), 
according to the value 
difference in each block in 
each colour, to identify the 
exchange bit 
Improved the original 
PVD algorithm, to 
make it can work on 
both grayscale and 
colour image. 
Measurement 
unit PSNR has 
a trivial 
decrease. 
Mandal and 
Das. 
Pixel Value 
Modification. 
(PVM) 
All the pixel value within the 
different colour matrices 
perform the function modulo 
3, according to the result, to 
identify the exchange bit. 
The stego image has a 
better quality and 
embedding capacity 
than PVD algorithm, 
and the computation 
time is lower. 
Only works on 
colour image. 
Nagaraj, 
Vijayalakshmi 
and Zayaraz. 
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LSB 
modification 
based on 
private stego-
keys 
Two keys are defined, one is 
used in embedding and 
extraction procedure; the 
other is used to verify the 
data integrity. The exchange 
bit is identified by the range 
of colour value difference. 
Compare to LSB 4, 
this algorithm has a 
superb image quality 
with the highest PSNR 
value. 
Only works on 
grayscale 
image, and 
the major 
security issue 
that is the 
transmission 
of both 
private keys 
Jain and 
Ahirwal. 
A derived 
algorithm 
from PVD. 
Define three different level 
to identify the exchange bit 
in edge areas. 
Has a better image 
quality than original 
PVD algorithm. 
 
Yang, Weng, 
Wang and 
Sun. 
Multi-Pixel 
Differencing. 
(MPD) 
Use for consecutive non-
overlapping blocks to collect 
the pixels from the image, 
according to the difference of 
pixels value in each block, to 
identify the exchange bit. 
Compared to LSB 2, 
original PVD and MPD 
algorithm, this 
algorithm has largest 
embedding capacity. 
The 
measurement 
unit PSNR is 
the lowest in 
all four of 
them. 
Jung, Ha and 
Yoo. 
Another 
algorithm 
based on PVD. 
The pixel blocks are gathered 
through four non-
overlapping pixels, and 
define one target pixel and 
three neighbouring pixels in 
each block. Only the target 
pixel will be exchanged 
according to the difference 
between the Max value and 
Min value in each block. 
Good quality in the 
stego image. 
Compared to 
Change’s [61] and 
Park’s [62] algorithm, 
this algorithm has the 
highest PSNR and a 
largest embedding 
capacity. 
 
Hanling, 
Guangzhi and 
Caiqiong. 
Hybrid edge 
detection 
algorithm 
Edges will be gathered into a 
set of blocks uniformly by 
using a hybrid detector 
algorithm. Reserve the first 
pixel to record the 
exchanging statement, and 
This method has a 
higher embedding 
capacity and better 
PSNR value than 
original LSB 
 
Chen, Chang 
and Le. 
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the rest pixels perform the 
LSB algorithm 
replacement 
algorithm. 
Stego 
information 
Table. 
Use a stego information table 
to record and consider the 
matching manipulation each 
time. 
Compared to original 
LSB matching 
algorithm, this 
algorithm has a better 
PSNR, and reduced  
noise in the 
histogram as much as 
possible 
Very large 
computation 
time during 
the 
embedding 
procedure. 
Qiudong and 
Liu. 
LSB Matching 
Revisited 
Unlike original LSB matching 
algorithm, two pixels are 
considered in each matching 
manipulation in this new 
algorithm. 
Improved the 
robustness from the 
original LSB matching 
algorithm, 
Only works on 
grayscale 
image. 
Mielikainen. 
Generalised 
LSB matching 
scheme. (G-
LSB-M) 
Improved the embedding 
manipulation from LSB 
matching revisits. The 
consideration unit is 
increased up to 3. Three bits 
are embedded in a ternary 
pixel array. 
The stego image has a 
lower probability of 
positive detection 
and it has a higher 
robustness than LSB 
matching revisited 
algorithm. 
 
Yang, Cheng 
and Zeng. 
Lossless data 
hiding based 
on LSB 
matching. 
Define and share a secret key 
between sender and 
receiver. Image is divided 
into two equal subsets duo to 
the key. Then perform the 
relevant matching 
manipulation according to 
the message bit and target 
pixel value. 
Compare to G-LSB-M 
algorithm, this 
method has a higher 
quality in both PSNR 
and MSE. Also, this 
method can be 
executed in multiple 
cover file, such as 
video and audio. 
The 
transmission 
of secret key is 
a security 
issue. 
Quan and 
Zhang. 
  
Spatial image steganography algorithms were reviewed within this sub-section. Although the 
algorithms are based on different ways to conceal the secret data, all of them utilise the redundancy 
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of colour intensity in human eyes. Some algorithms embed the data to the identified edge areas in the 
image by using relevant edge detections. Certain algorithms are using the difference of consecutive 
non-overlapping pixels to hide data accordingly. Also, some algorithms are implemented based on the 
feature of the colour intensity. For example, the author Parvez [46] offered a novel algorithm based 
on the Intensity of the colour image; the embedded data can be stored more in the lower colour value 
areas due to its negligible influences.  As the details of his Distortion Ratio experiment showed, the 
difference between the higher intensity and lower intensity has been examined, the change of higher 
intensity value colour has an obvious distortion ratio than that of the lower value colour.  
Therefore, for all spatial image steganography algorithms, the common principle is based on changing 
the pixel value in the cover image to ensure effective data hiding.  
 
2.2.4. Frequency Domain and its Stego-Algorithms 
According to the category of image presentation domain, the image can be presented both through 
the Spatial domain image and Frequency domain image systems. Normally, the spatial domain image 
consists of BMP, PNG and GIF; the frequency domain image predominantly contains JPEG, which is 
the most common online transmission image format [28].  
For the spatial domain image, the digital content is stored in accordance with the format of the images 
colour intensity (colour value), ranged from 0 to 255, which is denoted as [0,255]. Colours are most 
frequently represented as additive combinations of RGB (Red, Green, Blue) in each pixel which is the 
fundamental unit for the image [57].  
In the frequency domain, an image such as a JPEG image is presented as a transform domain, this 
format stores the coefficients of the cosines, representing the frequency of a value rather than storing 
the colour intensity that is assigned to each pixel. In other words, it means that the frequency domain 
image utilizes luminance and chrominance signals instead of RGB to represent an image. This is 
referred to as YUV. Y represents luminance, and the chrominance components (U and V) are the 
differences, as shown in the formula below [28]: 
Y = 0.299R + 0.587G + 0.114B 
U = R – Y 
V = B – Y 
However, in order to adjust all of those components to the same range [0,255] by using 8 bits, the 
chrominance components (U and V) are further linearly transformed to Cr and Cb as they fall into the 
range [-179, 179], obtaining the YCrCb colour model [28]. 
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Unlike the spatial domain, a JPEG image has a completely different compression process. As explained 
in the following, the procedure can be categorized into six phases [28]:  
1. Colour transformation, from RGB to YCrCb. (Although this step is unnecessary as JPEG can also 
work directly with the RGB representation). It is typically used because it enables higher 
compression ratios at the same fidelity). 
2. Divide image into 8 by 8 blocks.  
3. Perform DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) in 8 by 8 blocks. 
4. Quantization of the DCT blocks. 
5. Entropy coding. 
6. Generate the JPEG image. 
Thus, the steganography of a frequency domain image, requires an advanced algorithm to embed the 
data by using the LSB algorithm under the frequency value of each pixel rather than implementing the 
LSB algorithm under the colour intensity directly, such as with the JSTEG, F3, F4, F5 algorithms.  
However, the JPEG compression can be seen as a lossy procedure, the part of redundancy data within 
the digital information will be lost in the phase of quantization, as shown in Figure 21 below [58]. 
Therefore, these based-frequency algorithms are often implemented to embed data into the 
quantized DCT table after the quantization phase. Furthermore, hiding data before the entropy coding 
stage (after the quantization stage) would not affect the data, as the process of “DCT” and 
“Quantization” is lossy, and “Entropy Coding” is lossless. 
 
Figure 21: The illustration of JPEG compression [58] 
 
 
   pg. 56 
 
2.3. Steganalysis 
2.3.1. General Detections 
Steganalysis is a solution that is implemented to detect the hidden messages in cover files. For image 
steganalysis, the common detection mechanism is mainly divided into two ways; visual and histogram 
analysis.  
Visual detection compares the visual difference between an original image and a stego image. 
However, for advanced algorithms, it could utilize image redundant parts effectively, so that the 
difference cannot be detected by human eyes directly.  
Histogram detection (similarly known as statistics detection) can be represented with a histogram 
chart. This chart represents the various values of each of the RGB (red, green and blue) colour values. 
The X axis represents the colour’s value, from the minimum 0 to the maximum 255. The Y axis, 
represents the frequency of colours value. For example, in a 200 x 200 image, the pixel resolution is 
40,000. This means that the amount of RGB variations contains a total of 40,000 pixels for an image, 
as shown in the formula below: 
R: ∑ 𝑌(𝑥 = 𝑖) = 40,000255𝑖=0  
G: ∑ 𝑌(𝑥 = 𝑖) = 40,000255𝑖=0  
B: ∑ 𝑌(𝑥 = 𝑖) = 40,000255𝑖=0  
Therefore, the generated histogram counts the amount of each RGB colour from 0 to 255, and also 
presents the tonal distribution in digital image. The histogram detection compares the distribution of 
the value of RGB to distinguish the difference between an original image and a stego image.  
 
Figure 22: The visual detection comparison between the  original image and the stego image 
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Figure 23:The histogram detection comparison between the original image and the stego image (with a 
replacement algorithm) 
As shown in above Figures 22 & 23, a comparison can be seen between the original image and a stego 
image, the stego image concealed a TXT file with a file size of 100 KB. However, from the visual 
detection, it is hard to distinguish the difference, they are almost visually similar. From the histogram 
detection, the difference can be found absolutely, the hidden message has changed the colour’s 
distribution significantly, as the histogram conveys a more ‘ragged’ result in its output for the stego 
image. Also the specific difference value can be obtained from the below formula. “Diff” represents 
the total differences, and diffR, diffG, diffB represent the differences in red channel, green channel and 
blue channel respectively [43]. 
diffR :   ∑ |𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌′𝑖|255𝑖=0  
diffG : ∑ |𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌′𝑖|255𝑖=0  
diffB : ∑ |𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌′𝑖|255𝑖=0  
Diff = diffR + diffG + diffB. 
In the Golfer’s Bridge image in Figure 22, the difference in red is 59826, in green is 59050, in blue is 
60478. Thus the total difference “Diff” is 179354.  
Algorithms are being continually developed in steganography. The traditional histogram detection was 
not good enough due to the various advanced steganography algorithms, such as ‘Steganographic 
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information record table’ [43], which causes the embedding noise to be reduced, and makes the new 
histogram as much as possible with the original histogram. Therefore, new statistical methods are 
continuously being developed to account for better detection algorithms. In the next sub-section, the 
advanced steganalysis methods are discussed in more detail. 
 
2.3.2. Advanced Detections 
“Reliable Detection of LSB Steganography in Colour and Grayscale Images.” (RS attack) By 
Fridrich, Binghamton, Goljan and Du [47] 
A new reliable and extremely accurate steganalytic detection was presented for both colour and 
grayscale images. The concept of this method is based on the relationship between regular group 
pixels and singular group pixels, also it does not require the original cover image to be compared with 
the stego image. 
During the detection procedure, in the target image, the pixels can be divided into different groups G, 
which consist of a constant number of the element n (NB:Number of pixels in each group). The 
discrimination function f can be used to distinguish the identification of each group G, as shown in the 
formula below: 8 
𝑓(𝐺) = 𝑓(X1,  X2, … , Xn) =  ∑|Xi+1 − Xi|
n−1
i=1
 
Moreover, in order to set the category of each pixel group, the Flipping Function F was used before 
implementing the above discrimination function, the flipping result can be divided into three different 
situations due to the features of the LSB algorithm, such as F1, F−1 and F0.  
- In F1:0<->1, 2<->3, 4<->5,… 254<->255.  
- In F−1: -1<->0, 1<->2, 3<->4,…., 255<->256.  
- In F0: F0(x)= x.  
State a mask M with the value of [-1, 1], import this M into each pixel group G. For example, G = (39, 
38, 40, 41), M = (1, 0, 1, 0), -M = (-1, 0, -1, 0). So: 
F𝑚(G) = (F1(39), F0(38), F1(40), F0(41)) = (38, 38, 41, 41) 
                                                          
8 This formula also represents the image smoothness of adjacent pixels 
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F−m(G) = (F−1(39), F0(38), F−1(40), F0(41))  = (40, 38, 39, 41) 
Next, the specific pixel category can be defined due to the above function f and operation F, as follows: 
- Regular groups: G  R  f(F(G)) > f(G) 
- Singular groups: G  S  f(F(G)) < f(G) 
- Unusable groups: G  U  f(F(G)) = f(G) 
Finally, the parameters  𝑅𝑚,  𝑅−𝑚,  𝑆𝑚 and 𝑆−𝑚 can be obtained, where, 𝑅𝑚 and 𝑅−𝑚 indicate the 
number of regular groups for mask M; 𝑆𝑚 and 𝑆−𝑚 indicate the number of singular groups for mask 
M. In this detection, the concept is based on the relationship between the number of the regular group 
and singular group. 
In a normal image, there are: 
𝑅𝑚  𝑅−𝑚 and  𝑆𝑚  𝑆−𝑚 
However, if the image has a message embedded, this relationship will be violated, and will change to:  
𝑅−𝑚 - 𝑆−𝑚 > 𝑅𝑚 - 𝑆𝑚 
Therefore, in this detection method, based on statistical detection, not only the result is accurate, but 
also the implementation process is quite easy as it does not require the cover image for reference.  
 
“Steganalysis for LSB Matching in Images with High-frequency Noise.” By Zhang, Cox and 
Doerr [48] 
A targeted steganalysis method was proposed to detect the LSM Matching algorithm. The concept is 
to calculate the absolute differences between the local extrema, because the maxima will be 
decreased and the minima will be increased after executing the LSB Matching algorithm in the image. 
Also the neighbouring pixels of these local extrema are affected, an obvious reduction reflected on 
the image histogram. 
In the LSB Matching algorithm, there is a 50% probability that the pixel LSB will be changed. However, 
for an embedding rate p, the probability that pixels will not be modified in the cover image is (1 – p/2). 
Hence, the histogram of the stego image can be represented by: (ℎ𝑠  indicates the stego image 
histogram; ℎ𝑐 indicates the cover image histogram) 
ℎ𝑠(n) = (1 - 
𝑝
2
) ℎ𝑐(n) + 
𝑝
4
 (ℎ𝑐(n-1) + ℎ𝑐(n+1)) 
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Also, the local extremum n* can be obtained and defined from this formula, as shown in following 
function: 
ℎ𝑠(n*) = (1 - 
𝑝
2
) ℎ𝑐(n*) + 
𝑝
4
 (ℎ𝑐(n*-1) + ℎ𝑐(n*+1)) 
= ℎ𝑐(n*) - 
𝑝
4
 [(ℎ𝑐(n*) -  ℎ𝑐(n*-1)) + (ℎ𝑐(n*) -  ℎ𝑐(n*+1)) < ℎ𝑐(n*) 
However, the absolute differences between the extremum and its neighbours has an appreciable 
attenuation in the histogram. The maxima decreases and the minima increases. Thus, the stego 
image’s histogram is smoother than that of the original cover image. As the following function 
evidenced: 
𝐷𝑐 = ∑ |2. ℎ𝑐(𝑛 ∗)  − ℎ𝑐(𝑛 ∗ −1) − ℎ𝑐(𝑛 ∗ +1)|  𝑛∗  
𝐷𝑠 = ∑ |2. ℎ𝑠(𝑛 ∗)  −  ℎ𝑠(𝑛 ∗ −1) −  ℎ𝑠(𝑛 ∗ +1)|  𝑛∗  
 
In the conclusion, this detection was compared with other steganalysis, Ker’s detection [49] and 
Goljan’s [63] detection. This method has the highest probability of detection in spatial images (never-
compressed) in all three of them. However, if the dataset has been JPEG compressed, the testing result 
is not as good as expected. 
 
“LSB matching steganalysis based on patterns of pixel differences and random embedding.” 
By Lerch-Hostalot and Megias [50] 
A novel steganalysis method based on the identification of patterns of pixel differences (PPD) was 
proposed in 2012. The main idea is to analyse the differences between neighbouring pixels before and 
after injecting random data by using the LSB Matching algorithm. The target image can be identified 
through verifying the presentation of the patterns’ distribution.   
During the implementation procedure, the patterns of pixel differences d can be created by gathering 
all of the pixel value from the cover image. In order to simplify the complexity of pattern differences, 
a threshold has been exploited to reduce this value.  The threshold regulation is shown as follow: 
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦)  = {
𝑆 −  1, if |𝑥 −  𝑦|  𝑆 −  1 
|𝑥 −  𝑦|, if |𝑥 −  𝑦|  𝑆 −  1
 
where, S indicates the number of possible value of the pixel differences, x and y represent the target 
pixel and reference pixel respectively.  
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In addition, as the experiments proved, pixel pairs from the same direction contain redundant 
information whether in the horizontal, vertical or diagonal. Thus, half of the pixel information of each 
pair can be neglected due to its intrinsic symmetry, as the example shown in Figure 24: 
 
Figure 24:The illustration of reduction block [50]. 
(NB: the original 9 (3 x 3) pixels was simplified to 5 pixels. In the horizontal pair, (𝑋22 , 𝑋21) was 
neglected; in the vertical pair, (𝑋22, 𝑋32) was neglected; in the diagonal pair (𝑋22, 𝑋11) and (𝑋22, 𝑋31) 
were neglected.) 
Since the reference pixel can be chosen from any value in the reduction block, the rest of the target 
pixels can be defined to the corresponding position information which is related with the reference 
pixel; these are, l, ul, ur and r, representing ‘left’, ‘upper left’, ‘upper right’ and ‘right’ respectively. In 
these 5 pixels, N represents the array of the rest of target pixels, there are: 
N[1] = left; 
N[2] = upper left; 
N[3] = upper right; 
N[4] = right. 
Hence, combining the above functions, the pattern of pixel difference can be represented as:  
(NB: P indicates the pattern array; b indicates the reference pixel) 
P[i] = d(b, N[i]),  i=[1,4]. 
Also the maxima and minima P can be identified according to the different values of the reference 
pixel, denoted to 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Finally, an integer M which represents the pattern frequency value can be gathered by mapping these 
patterns’ values, the function is as shown below: 
M(P, S) = P[1]𝑆3 + P[2]𝑆2 + P[3]𝑆1 + P[4] + 1, 
Whether the target image contains a hidden message can be verified through counting the result of 
the pattern ratio. In this experiment, in order to compare the different ratio result between the cover 
image and the stego image, the random message was embedded into both of them. In the Histogram 
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Pattern, both images have the same result. Although the frequency decreases after the random 
message is embedded in the cover image, the magnitude is not obvious. However, in the Ratio of 
Pattern counters before and after random data embedding, the results of both images are extremely 
different. As shown in Figure 25: 
 
Figure 25: Ratio of pattern counter comparison between a cover image (a)  and the stego image (b)  [50] 
(NB: In this case, S was equal to 4. In the stego image, the values of the ratio are much more stable 
than in the cover image.) 
In this method, the stego image can be identified clearly through injecting random data into the target 
image with the LSB matching algorithm. If the Ratio of Pattern has a stable distribution, the target 
image can be identified as stego image, otherwise, it is a typical image. Although the computation 
process of this analysis method is complicated, it can be used widely to identify other advanced 
steganographic algorithms, even in JPEG steganography.  
 
“Steganalysis of additive noise modelable information hiding.” By Harmsen and Pearlman 
[51] 
Another steganaylsis method based on the identification of additive noise was presented in 2003, and 
it can be applied to detect multiple image steganography algorithms, such as LSB replacement, LSB 
matching, other frequency-based algorithms. Several theorems have been separately proved to 
distinguish the stego image from the cover image, because the stable correlation in the original cover 
image can be disturbed due to the injection of the secret data.   
During the steganography procedure, the generation of the stego image can be seen as the injection 
of (stego) noise to the cover image. Hence, the histogram of the stego image is equal to the 
convolution of the cove image histogram and stego noise, as shown in Formula 1: 
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ℎ𝑠[n] = ℎ𝑐[n] * 𝑓∆[n] 
(NB: Where 𝑓∆[n]  is the probability mass function, which indicates the probability that a pixel will be 
altered by n after inject the noise. The equation 1 is : 𝑓∆[n] ≜ p(𝑋𝑠 - 𝑋𝑐= n ). X indicates the pixel value.)  
In order to simplify the process of analysis, the above equation 1 and Formula 1 are evolved to the 
frequency domain presentation by using Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), also the result is defined 
to the Histogram Characteristic Function (HCF), which is a representation of the image histogram in 
the frequency domain, as shown in the following equation 2. 
𝐻𝑠 = 𝐹∆[k]𝐻𝑐[k]      DFT(ℎ𝑠[n] ) = DFT(𝑓∆[n] ) DFT(ℎ𝑐[n] ) 
The Histogram Characteristic Function Centre of Mass (HCF COM) is defined to the measurement of 
the HCF distribution, and the result is useful to identify the existence of the stego noise. As shown in 
equation 3 following: 
C(H[k]) ≜ 
∑ 𝑘 |𝐻[𝑘]|𝑘 ∈ 𝒦
∑  |𝐻[𝑖]|𝑖 ∈ 𝒦
 
(NB: Where, 𝒦 = {0, … 
𝑁
2
 - 1} and N is the length of DFT ) 
After injecting the stego noise to the cover image, the result of HCF COM may reduce or stay the same. 
As shown in Formula 2: 
C(𝐻𝑠[𝑘]) ≤ C(𝐻𝑐[𝑘]) 
Therefore, in the detection procedure, the stego image can be identified from HCF COM, the expected 
distribution is absolutely lower in the stego image. In their conclusion, this detection method has been 
demonstrated in different imagesets, the detected result has a high correct rate, especially in the 
identification of the LSB replacement algorithm. 
 
“Steganalysis of LSB Matching in Grayscale Images.” (Ker Detection). By Ker [49] 
As Harmsen did not implement his steganalysis on the grayscale image, the limitation was presented 
by Andrews D. Ker soon after. Although the original theorem stated that it should be available, the 
result of one-dimensional image steganography is far away from the expected result, which is much 
bigger. Hence, two novel detections based on the improvement of the HCF were proposed  two years 
after Harmsen’s publication [51].  
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Several pieces of evidence proved the unreliability of HFC in grayscale images, such as unknown 
C(𝐻𝑐[𝑘]) 9 and sparse distribution in grayscale image histogram10.  
In order to address the problem of unknown C(𝐻𝑐[𝑘]), a downsampling method was considered to 
use to gather the pixel, as shown in the follows Equation 1: 
𝑝𝑐
′ (i,j) = ⌊∑ ∑
𝑝𝑐(2𝑖+𝑢,2𝑗+𝑣)
4
1
𝑣=0
1
𝑢=0 ⌋  Equation 1 
(NB: Where, i and j represent the pixel coordinates in the image) 
As the massive experiment proved [49], the distribution between the original HCF COM and 
downsampling HCF COM is a linear with a correlation bitrate in 0.9967, which means that both results 
are very similar. So, the Equation 2 is as shown below: 
C(𝐻𝑐
′[𝑘]) ≈ C(𝐻𝑐[𝑘]),  Equation 2 
Also, after inject the stego noise (secret data) by using the LSB Matching algorithm, the Equation 3 is 
presented: 
C(𝐻𝑐[𝑘]) - C(𝐻𝑠[𝑘]) > C(𝐻𝑐
′[𝑘]) - C(𝐻𝑠
′[𝑘])  Equation 3 
Therefore, according to the above equations 2 & 3, the Formula 1 can be evolved: 
C(H[k]) < C(𝐻′[k]) 
The LSB Matching algorithm is subject to the above Formula 1, the existence of stego noise can be 
proved if the target image meets this theorem. Hence, the first detection method changes the pixel 
by using downsampling, and then observes the relationship between HCF COM and downsampling 
HCF COM in the target image. 
In the second detection method, the problem of sparse histogram distribution in the grayscale image 
has been fixed. The two-dimensional adjacency histogram is used instead of the colour intensity 
histogram, which indicates how often the pixel values have been observed next to each other in 
horizontal direction, making the histogram distribution much closer. This is shown in the following 
Equation 4: 
ℎ𝑐
2(m, n) = |{(i, j) |𝑝𝑐(i, j) = m, 𝑝𝑐(i, j+1) = n}|   Equation 4 
Next, the two-dimension HCF COM can be formed by the following Equation 5: 
                                                          
9 During the detection procedure, the cover image may be unknown. 
10 In three-dimensional colour image, the distribution is 𝑁3; in one dimensional grayscale image, it is only N. 
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𝐶2(𝐻2[k, l]) = 
∑ (𝑖+𝑗)|𝐻2[𝑖,𝑗]|𝑛𝑖,𝑗=0
∑ |𝐻2[𝑖,𝑗]|𝑛𝑖,𝑗=0
   Equation 5 
Finally, the stego noise can be identified by observing the two-dimension HCF COM relationship 
between the cover image and stego image. Also, this method can be combined with the above 
Formula 1 during the detection process without the related cover image.    
 
2.3.3. Summary of Steganalysis  
The development of steganalysis has been continually progressing. New detection methods are 
constantly being substituted and are evolving constantly. The majority of reasons for this are: 
- The detection result is subject to some parameters, such as the embedding rate. If the 
embedding rate is lower, the result will be not as good as expected.  
- The limitations of the detection method. For example, some of the methods only work on 
grayscale images. 
- The long computation time for the detection procedure, especially if a higher complexity 
algorithm is used. 
So far, there have been some novel steganalysis methods proposed, but most were updated soon 
after their development for the above reasons. 
 In 2008, a novel detection method based on the grayscale level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) was 
proposed by Abolghasemi et al[52]. By observing the pixel concentration distribution, the stego image 
can be distinguished from the cover image as the injection of secret data can affect the distribution 
along the diagonal direction in the co-occurring pixel matrix.  However, the limitations of this method 
were proved soon after. Firstly, this method was only available for grayscale images. Secondly, the 
accuracy was not as good as expected. Subsequently, this detection was improved by H.B.Keker in 
2011 [53]. Although this new method can be executed for colour images and the result is accurate, 
the complexity of computation still exists.  
Therefore, the two sides (steganography and steganalysis) are in a constant battle for the most 
effective detection methods. However, it is difficult to know which is best due to the diversity of 
steganography algorithms, especially for DLP systems. Many other factors need to be considered 
when developing DLP systems to prevent the potential risk from the steganography, such as the 
computational time. 
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3. Methodology  
Research Question: 
This research aims to investigate an effective solution in DLP systems to prevent the threat of image 
steganography. 
 
Objectives: 
In order to address the above research question, in this section, the specific methodology will be 
described from three aspects.  
 Firstly, the challenges / limitations of the DLP system should be analysed, to consider: 
- How can the confidential data, embedded in the cover file via Steganography, 
bypass the DLP system monitor?  
- Why the current steganalysis mechanisms can not detect the existence of 
steganography in DLP systems effectively?  
 Secondly, the preliminary investigation and research hypothesis will be discussed and analysed.  
 Finally, in order to prove the reliability and applicability of the presented solutions, the 
architecture of the experiments will be introduced. 
 
3.1. The relevant challenges   
Both algorithm and detection mechanisms are under constant evolution and optimisation. Especially, 
within a DLP system, some of the reliable steganalysis solutions are not suitable for implementation. 
The major challenges stem from two aspects, the diversity of the advanced algorithms and the 
limitation of the corresponding steganalysis.  
 
3.1.1. The Diversity of Steganography Algorithms  
The rapid development of steganography algorithms is the first challenge. Either in the spatial domain 
or in the frequency domain, the sophistication of steganalysis solutions and steganography algorithms 
are both advancing in a cat and mouse fashion, rendering many previous algorithms analysis and 
solutions obsolete. Often the novel steganography algorithms are one step ahead of steganalysis, 
making detection extremely difficult. For example, as mentioned by author Lou [30], the proposed 
algorithm has a good resistance to both RS attack and  𝑋2  attack which are the most effective 
steganalysis solution so far.    
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For a specific algorithm, different parameters can often generate the different stego image matrices 
such as the embedding rate according to traditional LSB algorithms. As the statistics from the above 
section show [31][38][39][40][41], the probability of detection and embedding rates are inversely 
proportional, the imperceptibility of the stego image can be increased by reducing the embedding 
rate. Therefore, the most serious challenge is based on the embedding rate during the application of 
the corresponding steganographic algorithm. The majority of novel proposed algorithms may bypass 
the detection of effective steganalysis when their embedding rate has a low value. 
There are many open source tools on the Internet 11 12, for both image and text based steganography. 
The complete procedure of steganography that involves the embedding and extracting process can be 
implemented by anyone, which means company data can be hidden easily by any internal staff, 
including non-technical personnel.  
  
3.1.2. The Limitation of Steganalysis Methods 
As discussed previously, steganalysis can be divided into visual detection and statistical detection in 
two separate ways. Often, the statistical detection method is the most effective solution to 
steganography, and the most common method is the histogram detection. 
However, the most important problem is the size of the (stolen or secret) company data (embedding 
rate) to be hidden. Detection techniques may display a minute difference in the cover image which 
cannot be distinguished by human eyes, or even in histogram charts, especially if this confidential data 
is just a few characters. Even for the most effective steganalysis, such as an RS attack, the detection 
result may not be reliable when the embedding rate is lower than 0.005 [30]. An example of LSB 
replacement algorithms can be seen in Figure 26 below (this is the histogram result between an 
original “Lena” image and LSB 1 stego “Lena” image which conceals hidden textual data, “this is for 
test !!!”).  
                                                          
11 Text Steganography Tool: http://manytools.org/hacker-tools/steganography-encode-text-into-image/ 
12 Image Steganography Tool: http://incoherency.co.uk/image-steganography/ 
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Figure 26: The histogram comparison between the original image and the LSB 1 stego image in Lena.bmp 
As Figure 26 above represents, there is an insignificant difference between LSB 0 and LSB 1. Therefore, 
in industry, DLP systems are faced with serious challenges, particularly in defence steganography. 
With the increase of steganography utilisation, it is very difficult to determine which solution can verify 
all algorithms effectively, as unreliable detection is wasting time and money in industry only. Secondly, 
within any DLP system, it is impossible for security staff to detect each single image in the company 
boundary traffic as they would have to be able to download the original image, and then compare it 
to a stego image for possible detection.  Thirdly, the most important is the content-aware work 
principle in the DLP system. An image file is identified as an image data stream in the network 
transmission rather than the text data stream. This can then lead to the successful exportation of 
sensitive company information by a malicious actor residing within the organisation, potentially 
causing serious reputable and financial damage.   
 
3.2. Preliminary Investigations 
In this section, the preliminary investigations will be introduced, which lead to the subsequent 
hypothesis and research solutions. These investigations are based on two aspects: 
 Network transmission, to discover the (next) destination of an email leaving the 
company boundary. 
 Concealment of data by concatenation, a simple method for the concealment of data 
by using file concatenation in a Windows system and its solution will be discussed.  
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3.2.1. Network Transmission  
Prior to preventing data loss within an enterprise network, it is necessary to determine the route of 
the network stream, and how DLP can identify the content of the transmission stream.  As mentioned 
in the above DLP system section, the DLP system is an integrated defence system, designed and 
implemented by multiple function modules. For example, the vendors may have provided a cloud 
service to protect the email transmission, meaning that the vendors could receive and identify the 
email content before the email arrives at the target destination. Although a vendor white paper [25] 
[26] did not introduce this, it was proved by the following experiments: 
(NB: This experiment was implemented on a Windows system, the email service used Googles Gmail, 
while the packet capturer was implemented by Wireshark.) 
The tested PC IP address was 138.251.207.129, located in the Jack Cole Building of the St Andrews 
Computer Science department, as shown in Figure 27 below: 
 
Figure 27: The details of target PC 
The network packets were captured by Wireshark after sending a simple email to a Hotmail hosted 
email service. Notably, the Wireshark did not capture any mail transfer protocol packets, such as POP 
or SMTP. Instead, the packets only contain TLSv1.2 and TCP even after filtering packets from the 
source IP 138.251.207.129, as shown in Figure 28 below: 
 
Figure 28: The detail of captured email packets 
Several packets were sent to the destination address 216.58.198.197. After tracking this IP address, it 
can be determined to belong to Google, Inc, as shown in Figure 29 below: 
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Figure 29: The explanation of IP: 216.58.198.197 
This is due to St-Andrews utilising Google’s Gmail as their email hosting platform up until 2015. Hence, 
this email was sent to the Google server first after it left the St Andrews network boundary. In addition, 
the email was sent via web browser, the inside of these packets were encrypted by the TLS protocol, 
which has been used for providing confidentiality and data integrity between two applications [54], 
the data is therefore unreadable, as shown in Figure 30 below: 
 
Figure 30:The specific detail of Secure Sockets Layer in the captured packet 
It should be noted that in Oct 2014, a vulnerability was found in SSL 3.0, so relevant products use the 
TLS protocol in Google [55]. For the vendor email service a remote cloud system will receive all of the 
email stream once it leaves the company network boundary. During the stream transmission, the data 
will be split into different packets depending on the capacity of a packet. Subsequently, this data will 
be encrypted in accordance with the transmission algorithm, and transform it to a human unreadable 
format. The data can be readable within remote vendor cloud systems; which means that any 
confidential data can be monitored and identified before forwarding to the destination address, and 
any malicious data leakage can be terminated in the cloud system. 
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3.2.2. Concealment of Data by Concatenation 
Prior to researching the solutions for the use of steganography algorithms within a DLP system, 
another efficient hiding method should be considered and solved. This method combines multiple files 
to implement the hiding of a target file. This experiment was implemented in a Windows O/S; the files 
were linked by system commands in the Windows “cmd”. 
The hiding procedure is divided into three phases: 
1. Prepare an image as the cover file, 
2. Compress the data to a .zip file.  
3. Type in the command “copy /b File1 + File2 File3” in CMD. 
- File 1 represents the cover image,  
- File 2 represents the secret data file, 
- File 3 represents the new generated file, and this file can be defined in any types. 
An example of this steganographic technique can be shown in Figure 31 below,  
 
Figure 31: The command of hiding data by the concatenation method in a Windows system 
 (NB: The data file has to be linked behind the image file, otherwise, the newly generated image is 
unreadable. For more details, refer to Appendix A). 
During the extraction procedure, the data can be removed through an unzip on ‘File 3’ directly. For 
example, in a Windows system, run the ‘7 zip File Manager’, click the StegoWithZip.png file and the 
data will be uncompressed and display the final result, as shown in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure 32: The extracted result of a  target file by using the 7zip File Manager 
Therefore, in this method, the merging steganographic technique can be implemented easily and the 
result is imperceptible to visual detection, as shown in Figure 33 below.  
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Figure 33: The visual comparison between the original image and the merged image 
The first consideration is that of memory allocation. Unlike in a steganography algorithm, the size of 
the newly generated ‘File 3’ has been increased with the addition of the large data file (‘File 2’), the 
size of ‘File 3’ is the combination of the size of both ‘File 1’ and ‘File 2’, as shown in Figure 34 below. 
Instead, in steganography, the size of generated stego image can be the same as the original cover 
image.   
 
Figure 34: The details of experimental files 
An obvious result was produced in the example from Figure 34 above, the data file was a TXT file 
rather than .zip file, because the zip compression will reduce the size of file so significantly that the 
compared result is therefore negligible. Normally, in order to decrease the file size, the data file is 
compressed to a .zip file, which reduces the overall file size as much as possible. This is shown in Figure 
35 below: 
(NB: where ‘File 1’ is the above StA.png, and the data.txt (‘File 2’) is compressed to data.7z.) 
 
Figure 35:The details of experimental files; the secret file is compressed to a zip file 
Secondly, the most important vulnerability is to break the previous format signature. The file signature 
is also referred to as a magic number, which is used to identify or verify the content of a file. Every file 
has the different hex signature according to their different file extension [56]. For the most popular 
image files, such as BMP, PNG and JPEG (JPG), the hex signature are as follows: 
- BMP: starts with “42 4D”, the end hex digits are not defined. 
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- PNG: starts with “89 50”, the end is “60 82”. 
- JPEG (JPG): starts with “FF D8”, the end is “FF D9”. 
However, with the merging of the data files behind these images, the end part of file signature will be 
extended according to the linked data file extension, until all of the content of data file has been 
represented, as shown in Figure 36 below. 
 
Figure 36: The target hex result in Hex Fiend 
From this example, the result file is a PNG image generated by the combination of a PNG image with 
a .zip data file. The original PNG end signature is “60 82”, yet more hex data demonstrates the linked 
file contains the newly generated end signature value of “00 00”. 
Therefore, a second vulnerability or limitation is the identification of the hex signature. Some effective 
tools are recommended to implement the corresponding identification. One of which includes 
checking the hex signature, which can be done by using some open source tools, such as WinHex, Hex 
Fiend, and how the content can reflect the file’s properties. In the example above, Figure 36, the 
screenshot results from the software “Hex Fiend” on a Mac system and the malicious data can be 
identified easily due to its file extension. However, for JPEG and PNG images, they both contain a 
definite signature either at the start or at the end. When it comes to a BMP image, the end part of the 
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signature is not defined, so that the identification is often unreliable in BMP image by using these hex 
editor tools. 
Another effective tool that has been used to distinguish the malicious sub-file within a file is “Binwalk”.  
According to the different starting signature of each file, the specific sub-file can be identified as well 
as the corresponding description. As shown in Figure 37 below, the experiment result was from a BMP 
image that was linked a TXT file.  
 
Figure 37: The binwalk search result when the secret file was a TXT file 
Also, as shown in Figure 38 below, the experiment result was from a BMP image which was linked to 
a .zip file. 
 
Figure 38: The binwalk search result when the secret file was a .zip file 
Therefore, for the file concealment method as a steganographic technique, although the 
implementation procedure is simple, it can be detected easily through identifying the corresponding 
signature within the file. In addition, the excessive file size can be seen as a malicious file directly, 
which may be caused by the merging of a large data file.  
 
 
3.3. The Research Hypothesis  
The concept of helping industry by preventing data from being exported with the use of the LSB 
algorithm predominantly stems from two aspects:  
Firstly, an unsuccessful steganography process can be divided into three features [28]:  
“1. Prove the existence of the confidential message.  
  2. Extract the confidential message 
  3. Destroy the confidential message.” 
   pg. 75 
 
Therefore, for the enterprise, there is nothing lost as long as the secret data is not readable. As their 
aim is to protect the confidentiality of data, it is unnecessary to prove the existence of confidential 
messages or even extract them, even destroying the secret data alone can meet their requirements. 
Also, the solutions to protect against corporate loss in a DLP system should be implemented efficiently 
and effectively, as many images sent are normal images in network traffic.  
Secondly, as the summary of the LSB algorithm in the previously discussed Literature Review section 
showed, for the spatial domain image, the algorithms conceal the confidential data by modifying the 
value of image pixels, regardless of whether the algorithm is based on edge detection or value 
differences. The extraction phase is also based on the intensity of each image pixel and corresponding 
stego key. Consequently, on the condition that there is no visible distortion of the image, if some of 
the stego image pixel values are randomized, the confidential data can be destroyed and become 
unreadable even if extracted by a stego key.  
 
Therefore, the Research Hypothesis to be presented in this thesis is: 
     By modifying the pixel values of spatial domain images slightly, secret messages hidden 
inside cover images will be destroyed, while the image quality would be preserved. 
 
3.4. Experimental Architecture 
In order to verify the correctness of the above hypothesis, some experiments were designed and 
implemented to investigate the influences between original pixels and randomized pixels. Two 
effective solutions are presented; both are subject to the modification of image pixel value. One is 
based on the modification of image chrominance, which is the Chrominance Modification Algorithm 
(CMA). The value of RGB in each pixel is affected by changing the value of chrominance. This is in YUV, 
where, the value of U and V will be changed, the value of Y is kept constant, rather than changing the 
colour intensity directly as luminance is more sensitive for human eyes [28]. 
The other solution is based on the conversion of the image frequency domain, which is called 
Presentation Domain Transform (PDT). The compression of JPEG images is a lossy procedure, the 
quantization phase is an irreversible process, even if reverse engineered, the initial value could never 
be revealed [28]. 
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These experiments were divided into two stages. The reliability and applicability of both solutions 
need to be verified first, then the results need to be analysed and evaluated. The specific experimental 
procedure is described as below: 
Required Tools  
In order to enhance the transparency of the experiments as well as deeply understand the 
experimental procedure, two tools were developed in Java with JRE System Library “JaveSE-1.7”. One 
tool is based on data hiding and the other tool is based on data extraction. 
Algorithm  
The LSB algorithm was executed in the embedding process. Similar to the majority of online open-
source software, the algorithm (LSB 1) can be implemented through replacing data of the last bit of 
each pixel value with each message bit. In addition, in the developed tool, the replacement bit(s) in 
each pixel is controllable, from LSB 1 to LSB 8, to implement multiple bits embedded to increase the 
data hiding capacity. This implementation also can be used as a reference tool to detect the quality 
threshold that represents the image distortion for the traditional LSB algorithm. 
Measure Threshold 
With the constant increase of data size, the maximum bits available within LSB 1 is sometimes not 
enough to hide all of the data. Generally, in order to digest a large volume of data, increasing the 
number of bits replaced is an easier way to implement data hiding, although the image distortion 
becomes appreciable with the increase in replaced bits.  
Therefore, the threshold of the traditional LSB algorithm should be measured for understanding its 
limitation further. As described by Fyffe [64], the visual threshold was identified at 3 bits LSB (LSB 3) 
through experimentation with 25 men and 25 women ranging from 20 - 60 years old. The subject 
viewed multiple visual examples of images with and without embedded hidden data. 
Notably, as mentioned above, luminance is more sensitive for human eyes. Hence, the threshold result 
may not be very exact if an answer is given using visual detection only. The visual comparison between 
the original cover image and the stego image in “StAndrews Bridge.png” and “Lena.png”, with both 
images containing 100 KB of embedded data from a TXT file using the LSB 3 algorithm is shown in 
Figures 39 and 40. The data was embedded from the upper left corner of the image, and down the 
vertical direction. Obviously, in Figure 39, the stego image has appreciable blur, from the left side, 
especially in the sky part of the image. However, under same conditions with the same algorithm, the 
visual difference is negligible in Lena.png. 
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Figure 39: The visual comparison between the original cover image and LSB 3 stego image, in StABridge.png 
 
 
Figure 40: The visual comparison between the original cover image and LSB 3 stego image, in Lena.png 
 
Therefore, due to the influence of pixel intensity, the identification of a threshold is unreliable if the 
detection statistics is only from human visibility. In the next section, in order to enhance the credibility 
of the results, the threshold will be identified by using corresponding measurement units.  
 
Measurement Units and Tools 
Two measurement units will be used to verify the quality of image in the next sections; there are the 
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and the Mean Squared Error (MSE). As mentioned before, the 
quality of images and MSE are inversely proportional, the higher value of MSE indicates a dissimilarity 
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between the compared images. However, the value of PSNR indicates the quality of an image, with a 
higher value indicating a better quality. 
Firstly, these measurement units will be used to identify the threshold of the LSB algorithm, through 
calculating the value between the original cover image and n bit (n [1, 8]) LSB stego image. The 
significant point of detection can be seen as the threshold. 
Next, these units can also be used to evaluate the performance of two presented solutions, to verify 
which one is better.  
In addition, an online histogram tool [59] is selected to measure the distribution of the image colour 
intensity. 
 
Experimental Structure  
Prior to implementing the experiment, the relevant preparatory works were performed: 
 Use different n to execute n bit(s) LSB algorithm in several cover images and use three 
different size TXT files as the secret (embedded) file. The cover images were selected from 
different frequency domain and spatial domain images. 
 Collect all of the generated stego images and determine the threshold of LSB algorithms 
through statistical measurement.  A histogram result is recorded for analysing the distribution 
change for the different sizes of embedding data.   
In order to verify the applicability of presented solutions, the entire experimental procedure is divided 
into three phases. 
- Phase 1: Pick all of imperceptible stego images in which the replaced bit n is under the range 
of the algorithm threshold, and implement presented solutions to these stego images 
respectively. 
- Phase 2: Verify the applicability and reliability of these solutions through comparing data 
extraction results between the original stego image and a processed stego image. 
- Phase 3: Identify the efficiency of these solution through benchmarking (measurement units). 
In this experimental procedure, in order to confirm the distortion level of stego images using 
the LSB algorithm, the threshold should be researched first as the main risk often comes from 
the target image which is under this threshold. Otherwise, the distorted image will be 
identified malicious, and be blocked by defence system. Then, these images will be used to 
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examine the applicability of the solutions by observing the data extracted result after 
implementing the relevant solutions. If the result is unreadable and there is not a noticeable 
distortion in the image, it would prove the usability of these solutions and research hypothesis. 
Finally, accordingly through benchmarking the different solutions, the most effective solution 
will be identified. 
 
Analysis  
The evaluation of both solutions will be analysed through comparison with different parameters, such 
as histograms, PSNR and MSE. Finally, all of the results will be combined to verify the performance of 
each solution, and determine which one is the most effective solution for DLP systems to prevent the 
application of steganography.  
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4. Implementation  
In this section, the implementation of the project will be explained from three separate aspects: 
- Firstly, the developmental procedure of the utility tools will be introduced. The implementation 
of the core algorithm, LSB replacement, will also be explained in this part.  
- Secondly, the specific experimental processes will be described. The reliability of the hypothesis 
and the applicability of the solutions will be verified. 
- Thirdly, in order to determine and analyse the effect of the solutions on the image, the relevant 
measurement units will be computed.  
 
4.1. Developed Tools  
This project, developed in the Java programming language, consists of two different tools. The fulfilled 
text based steganography and steganalysis – embedding / extracting a secret text into a cover image, 
see Figure 41 below. 
 
Figure 41: The Tools of this project 
 
4.1.1. Text Steganography Tool 
Class Description 
In this tool, the program consists of four packages: FileProcess, MainPage, SteganProcess and 
UIDesign.  
The FileProcess package contains two java classes: ReadFile and WriteFile, the responsibility of which 
are file processing. 
- The ReadFile class is implemented for reading in the cover image and the confidential (hidden) 
data.  
- The WriteFile class focuses on saving the stego key in a user-defined directory. 
The MainPage package is the main function of this tool lies, and presented in the Main class.  
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The SteganProcess package, which is responsible for the procedure of data embedding, consists of 
four java classes: ArrangeData, Exchange, GenerateImage and ProcessFlow.  
- In the ArrangeData class, the decimal numbers are converted to binary. In order to collect the 
data precisely during extraction manipulation, it should be noticed that the length of the 
converted binary must be equal to 8 bits in the embedding procedure. Otherwise, the program 
will fill 0s automatically in the front of each binary number until this length requirement is 
met. 
- In the Exchange class, the n bit(s) LSB in the cover image will be replaced by the corresponding 
n bits in the secret message. The value of n is pre-set by the users. The binary representation 
of the stego image will be calculated based on the user input variables, and stored in an 
ArrayList. In addition, this class also contains two types of replacement methods, one is in the 
horizontal or vertical direction, while the other is in random positions. 
- In the GenerateImage class, the stego image will be generated from the newly generated 
ArrayList. 
- The ProcessFlow class controls the work flow of the complete data embedding process. The 
status of each step will be printed on the system console (as shown in Figure 42), to make it 
convenient for the users to keep track of the system progress. 
 
Figure 42: The details of process track in system console 
 
In the package of UIDesign, two classes - ButtonFrame and MyFrame are developed to build the GUI 
for this tool.  
- In the ButtonFrame class, the specific buttons are placed in the bottom of the GUI, and aligned 
using the GridLayout.  
- In the MyFrame class, the integral layout of this application is designed by using the method 
of BorderLayout. The screenshot of the final application GUI is shown in Figure 43: 
   pg. 82 
 
 
Figure 43: The GUI layout in Steganography Tool 
Combining the above descriptions, this tool contains 9 java classes in total, as shown in Figure 44 
below: 
 
Figure 44: Details of the developed classes and packages in the steganography tool 
 
Procedure Description 
The work flow of the data embedding process can be divided into eight steps, there are: 
- Step 1: Import cover image. 
The user can select one cover image from the local directory. Three cover image formats are supported 
in this program - JPEG, BMP and PNG. The (R, G, B) value (0 to 255) of each pixel of the imported image 
are stored in an ArrayList named “cover_image_list”. 
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- Step 2: Convert decimal presentation of the image into binary form.  
Each item in the cover_image_list will then be converted from decimal into binary. After the 
conversion, each item in the list will be padded with extra 0s in the left side until its length reaches 8. 
The converted result will be saved into an ArrayList name “image_binary_list”. As shown in Figure 45: 
 
Figure 45: The code explanation, convert decimal to string, fill the extra 0s until the length meets 8 
- Step 3: Import confidential data. 
The secret data will be imported in this step (only TXT format is allowed in this tool). In order to extract 
the data precisely in the steganalysis process, a “line break” symbol must be added to each end of the 
rows of the secret data (shown in Figure 46). All information can be saved in decimal form and stored 
into an ArrayList called “data_list”. 
 
Figure 46: The code explanation, write an extra line break during reading the secret message. 
- Step 4: Convert the formatted secret data into binary form.  
The data will firstly be split into single characters, and then converted from string to binary form. The 
result of this conversion will be stored in an ArrayList named “data_binary_list”. Again, extra 0s are 
inserted in front of each item (pixel) until the length of the binary value meets 8, in Figure 47 below: 
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Figure 47: The code explanation, convert the secret message to 8-bit binary format. 
- Step 5: Split the data binary list into a single character  
In this step, in order to execute the data replacement operation more conveniently during the 
embedding process, the generated ArrayList of binary strings will be split into single digits and stored 
in the ArrayList called “single_data_binary_list”. 
- Step 6: Execute LSB algorithm  
In this step, the replacing procedure is implemented. According to the requirements of the user, the 
number of replacing bits n can be selected from the range of [1,8]. The format of the generated stego 
image can be set to PNG, BMP or JPEG, although the JPEG format is not a good option for concealing 
data by using LSB algorithm. 
During the replacing process, the quantity of pixels to be replaced will be calculated, as shown in Figure 
48: 
 
Figure 48: The code explanation, the equation of quantity of expected replacing pixels 
where, the variables “key” and “insertList” represent the number of replace bit “n” and 
“single_data_binary_list” separately. The variable “rows” is calculated to determine the quantity of 
pixels to be replaced from the cover image (the quantity of RGB in the cover image).  
According to the value of “rows”, the corresponding data will be extracted from “image_binary_list”. 
And then the execute n (key) bit replacement operation is applied with the data list 
“single_data_binary_list” to recombine a new pixel, as shown in Figure 49 below:  
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Figure 49:The code explanation, the procedure of replace the bits and generate a new pixel 
Finally, these stored data elements will be re-combined from the character form to the 8-bit binary 
form, and returned to “ProcessFlow”.  
In addition, in this class, two functions can be chosen; there are “changeXY” and “changeRandom”. If 
the data is to be embedded in either the horizontal or vertical direction, the function of “changeXY” 
will be called. Instead, if the data is to be embedded randomly, the second function “changeRandom” 
will be executed.   
The random procedure is almost the same as the function of “changeXY”. According to the value of 
variable “rows”, the relative quantity of cover image pixels will be extracted by using the random 
method before implementing the replacement with the corresponding data. Also in order to record 
the position of these random pixels, an ArrayList named “random_index” is used to store them and 
print to a “random_indext.txt” file, as shown in Figure 50: 
 
Figure 50: The code explanation, the method of obtaining the random position in the cover image. 
- Step 7: Generate stego image 
In this step, the colour of the stego image will be combined and stored into an ArraryList named 
“myColor” according to the new pixel information from the above step, as shown in Figure 51: 
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Figure 51: The code explanation, the procedure of re-combine a new pixel 
Subsequently, the stego image can be drawn from the “myColor”, also the image format can be chosen 
from the one of BMP, JPEG and PNG, as shown in Figure 52: 
 
Figure 52: The code explanation, the procedure of repaint a stego image from the new pixel matrix. 
Moreover, the stego image can be displayed in a separate window, as shown in Figure 53: 
 
Figure 53: The visual comparison between the cover image and the LSB 5 stego image, in StAbaridge.png 
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- Step 8: Release the stego key 
Lastly, the stego key will be printed to a user-defined path. It contains two parameters; value of n and 
the character length of the embedded data, where, n denotes the number of bits of replaced data in 
each pixel. 
 
4.1.2. Text Steganalysis Tool 
This program consists of four packages, “AnalysisProcess”, “FileProcess”, “MainPage” and “UIDesign”. 
Besides the package “AnalysisProcess”, the functionalities of other packages are the same as the 
above Text_Steganography_Tool. Also the GUI is the same, as shown in Figure 54: 
 
Figure 54: The GUI layout in Steganalysis Tool 
The package of “AnalysisProcess” is the core operation for extracting the secret data from the stego 
image and it contains four different class files, CollectData, CombineStr, ProcessFlow and 
TransformData. 
- In the CollectData class, the extraction of embedded data is executed according to the 
gathered pixel from the stego image and the detail of the key. The final data is stored in 8-bit 
binary form.  
- In the CombineStr class, the data will be re-combined from character to 8-bit binary form. 
- In the ProcessFlow class, the complete extracting data procedure is implemented. As with the 
ProcessFlow in Text_Steganography_Tool, the status of each step will be printed out on the 
system console (as shown in Figure 55), to make it convenient for the users to keep track of 
the system progress: 
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Figure 55: The details of process track in system console 
- In the TransformData class, the extracted data will be transformed from the 8-bit binary form 
to the human readable plaintext. 
During the extraction process, the work flow can be divided into five steps and the specific procedure 
is described as follows: 
- Step1: import stego image and extract pixel data  
The stego image will be imported, the file format can be selected in a range of [PNG, BMP, JPEG], and 
all of the RGB information is gathered into an ArrayList named “image_list” in 8-bit binary form. 
According to the previous stego image generation method, two functions will be considered to 
describe the horizontal direction or vertical direction of data manipulation. 
- Step2: analyse the key and extract corresponding information 
The information of stego key will be read, the replaced bit n and the character length of embedding 
data will be extracted and stored, which are referred to the variables “KeyOfIndex” and ”KeyOfSize” 
separately in this case.   
- Step3: extract the replaced pixels according to their quantity.  
In this step, according to the details of the stego key, the quantity of replaced pixels can be 
determined, and these pixels will be stored in an ArrayList named “changed_data_list” in the 8-bit 
binary form, as shown in Figure 56, 
 
Figure 56: The code explanation, the equation of quantity of replaced pixels 
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However, for the random embedding, the extraction process will more complicated. The system needs 
the sequence information of randomly embedded pixels. Hence, one more randomness pixel 
information file is required, which is generated while embedding data by using the randomness 
method. The detail of these pixels will be gathered to an ArrayList named “random_key_list”. 
Subsequently, the replaced pixels will be extracted and stored to “changed_data_list” in an 8-bit 
binary form according to these random sequences, as shown in Figure 57: 
 
Figure 57: The code explanation, the method of identify the randomly hidden position 
- Step 4: extract the specific embedded data  
The specific embedded data can be extracted in character form according to the detail of replaced 
pixels “changed_data_list” and value of replaced bits n. All of these characters will be re-combined 
into a new ArrayList in 8-bit binary form.   
- Step 5: transform the embedded data to plaintext. 
According to the information from step 4, the final embedded data can be transformed to the human 
readable plaintext, and printed out to “extract_out.txt” file, which is located in the “OutFile” file in 
this program. 
 
4.2. Experimental Procedure  
As mentioned from the Methodology section, the entire experimental procedure is divided into three 
phases:  
 Phase 1, the n bit LSB algorithm will be implemented with different integers in a range of [1 … 
8], and the cover image can be selected from the image database. The specific stego image 
result will be selectively displayed.  
 Phase 2, identify the potential threshold (of human visual detection) by analysing the 
distribution of the measurement units (see below). 
 Phase 3, according to the threshold result from Phase 2, the stego image, will be selected from 
the range of n that is under the threshold, to verify the applicability and reliability of two 
proposed solutions. 
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In this section, the experimental procedure is further discussed below. Prior to implementing the 
experiment, the corresponding experimental materials are described, and specific equations of 
measurement units are introduced for the analysis.  
 
4.2.1. Experimental materials and measurement units 
Cover Images Database 
In total, there are eight images to be investigated according to their different background colours and 
image resolution in the experiments. Lena and ModrianTree are typical images frequently used in 
image processing and image stenography examples. The other images are selected randomly from the 
website of the research university. 
(NB: The large resolution images are filled in red) 
 
Image type Size Resolution Bit depth 
Lena.bmp Bitmap 768 KB 512 * 512 24 
ModrianTree.bmp Bitmap 3.97 MB 1447 * 959 24 
Tiger.bmp Bitmap 225 KB 320 * 240 24 
Cathedral.jpg  JPEG 14.9 KB 253 * 450 24 
Edinburgh.jpg JPEG 68.2 KB 615 * 410 24 
Lena.png PNG 602 KB 512 * 512 32 
Modrian.png PNG 18.1 KB 1024 * 768 32 
StABridge.png PNG 399 KB 534 * 408 32 
Table 2: The details of experimental images 
Confidential Data 
There are three different sizes of text files (.txt) to be used as the confidential data. The sizes are 20 
bytes, 42 KB and 119 KB respectively, as shown in Figure 58: 
 
Figure 58: The details of experimental secret files 
Measurement Units 
Three measurement units are used to identify the threshold as well as verify the viability of the 
proposed solutions. There are PTR, PSNR and MSE. 
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PTR denotes the “Pixel Transformed Rate”, it represents the replaced (embedded) rate after 
implementing the LSB algorithm in the cover image. The specific equation derived and presented by 
this thesis is shown below:  
𝑃𝑇𝑅 =  
𝐵𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑓_𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑛 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑓_𝑖𝑚𝑔
=  
𝐴_𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟 ∗ 8
𝑀 ∗ 𝑁 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑃 ∗ 𝑛
  
Where n denotes n bit LSB algorithm, M and N denote the width and height of this image respectively, 
bpp denotes the Bit Per Pixel, which gives the resolution of the image. For example, in a colour image, 
each pixel has 24 bits consisting of three colour channels, Red, Green and Blue. A_char denotes the 
number of characters in the secret data file (including the space and other characters or symbols). 
As mentioned in the above Methodology sections, PSNR and MSE are the measurement units that 
represent the correlation between the original image and the current image. The quality of image can 
be indicated by the value of PSNR directly as they are proportional. Instead, the MSE is inversely 
proportional as it indicates dissimilarity of images. The equations are shown in the formula below [65] 
[66]: 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =  
∑ [𝐼1(𝑚, 𝑛)  − 𝐼2(𝑚, 𝑛) ]
2
𝑀,𝑁
𝑀 ∗ 𝑁
 
𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 10 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(
𝑅2
𝑀𝑆𝐸
) 
 
Both equations can be implemented in MATLAB directly and the specific process is as below: 
- Import both images; original cover image and generated stego image, as shown in Figure 59: 
 
Figure 59: The methods of reading the cover image and the stego image in MatLab 
 
- Call the corresponding functions directly, as shown in Figure 60: 
 
Figure 60: The PSNR result between the cover image and the stego image 
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In the experiments, the relevant manipulations are implemented by the developed tools, whether in 
the embedding procedure or in the extraction procedure. The measurement units PSNR and MSE are 
computed by MATLAB directly through its built-in functions.  
 
4.2.2. Phase 1: The Implementation of the LSB Replacement Algorithm  
The implementation was based on the size of confidential data, the algorithm was chosen from LSB 1 
to LSB 8 in vertical way to implement the data replacement, and the cover images are selected from 
the cover image database. In this sub-section, the results of newly generated stego images were 
displayed for human visual detection (comparison). Also, in order to compare the visual difference 
between the vertical embedding and random embedding, the relevant randomness replacement 
manipulations were performed with a large size data file, and the result of newly generated stego 
images were displayed in the end of this sub-section. 
(NB: In this sub-section, only the results of LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5 will be shown for brevity, and the rest 
of the image results can be found in Appendix B) 
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In dataTest.txt file, (20 bytes) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure 61: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.bmp, with very short size data file. 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure 62: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.bmp, with very short size data file. 
 
Tiger.bmp 
 
Figure 63: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Tiger.bmp, with very short size data file. 
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Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure 64: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Cathedral.jpg, with very short size data file. 
 
Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure 65: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Edinburgh.jpg, with very short size data file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure 66: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.png, with very short size data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure 67: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.png, with very short size data file. 
 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure 68: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in StABridge.png, with very short size data file. 
From the above experimental images (Figures 61 - 68), the variation that is caused by the LSB 
algorithm is not appreciable, as the embedding data is quite small, only 20 bytes. By inspecting the 
experimental result of LSB 8 on StABridge.png closely, at the top left hand corner of the image, some 
small bold “black point pixels” can be viewed. This is caused by the injection of the secret data, as 
shown in Figure 69 below: 
 
Figure 69: The position of hidden (very short size) message file in the cover image,  StABridge.png 
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In dataSmall.txt file, (42 KB) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure 70: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.bmp, with a small size data file. 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure 71: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in MondrianTree.bmp, with a small size data file. 
 
Tiger.bmp 
 
Figure 72: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Tiger.bmp, with a small size data file. 
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Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure 73: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Cathedral.jpg, with a small size data file. 
(NB: An appreciable variation can be viewed from the left side of image, particularly in the 
experimental image result of LSB 5 in Figure 73.) 
 
Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure 74: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Edinburgh.jpg, with a small size data file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure 75: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.png, with a small size data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure 76: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.png, with a small size data file. 
 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure 77: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in StAaBridge.png, with a small size data file. 
(NB: Some variations can be viewed from the left side of image, particularly in the experimental 
image result of LSB 5 in Figure 77.)  
 
From the above experimental images, compared with the result of embedding a “testing” file, the 
variation can be distinguished easily. By inspecting the left side of the image, the affected areas, which 
are caused by the injection of embedding data, have been pixelated/distorted with the increase in 
replaced bits in the LSB algorithm. This can be seen on the top left corner of Figure 73 above in the 
right hand side image. Particularly, the visual result is obvious in the bright (background) images, such 
as “StABridge.png”. In the result of LSB 3, this area becomes “smooth”; in the result of LSB 5, this area 
is extremely visible; in the result of LSB 8, this area is substituted by “Black” colour, as show in Figures 
78 & 79 below: 
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Figure 78: The distortion areas of the stego image in LSB 3 
 
Figure 79: The distortion areas comparison in LSB 3, LSB 5 and LSB 8 
 
In dataLarge.txt file, (119 KB) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure 80: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.bmp, with a large size data file. 
 
   pg. 100 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure 81: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.bmp, with a large size data file. 
 
Tiger.bmp 
 
Figure 82: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Tiger.bmp, with a large size data file. LSB 1 is not 
enough for concealing the secret message 
 
Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure 83: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Cathedral.jpg, with a large size data. LSB 1 is not 
sufficient to conceal the secret message file. 
 
   pg. 101 
 
Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure 84: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Edinburgh.jpg, with a large size data. LSB 1 is not 
sufficient to conceal the secret message file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure 85: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.png, with a large size data file. 
 
Mondrian.png 
 
Figure 86: The stego image results in LSB 1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.png, with a large size data file. 
 
 
 
   pg. 102 
 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure 87: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in StABridge.jpg, with a large size data. LSB 1 is not 
sufficient to conceal the secret message file. 
 
From the above experimental images, the area of variation is intensively distributed in the stego 
image. There is a significant variation as the size of the embedding file is up to 119 KB. Again, the 
appreciable difference can be viewed from the left side of the image. The visual result is extremely 
obvious in the bright (background) colour images. Particularly, in the higher replaced bit LSB algorithm.  
 
In Randomness (with large size data), (119 KB) 
Unlike the vertical replacement, the replaced positon was not picked one by one from the beginning 
of the image (top left corner). The system will compute the amount of required pixels according to the 
specific algorithm and the length of confidential data, then the position of these pixels will be chosen 
randomly from the cover image. The corresponding replacement manipulations are executed in these 
collected pixels. 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure 88: The stego image results in LSB1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Lena.bmp, with a large size data file  with a  
random embedding algorithm. 
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Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure 89: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Cathedral.jpg, with a large size data in randomly 
embedded. LSB 1 is not sufficient to conceal the secret message file. 
 
Mondrian.png 
 
Figure 90: The stego image results in LSB1, LSB 3 and LSB 5, in Mondrian.png, with a large  size file  with a  
random embedding algorithm. 
 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure 91: The stego image results in LSB 3 and LSB 5, in StABridge.png, with a large size data file with a  
random embedding algorithm. LSB 1 is not sufficient to conceal the secret message file. 
   pg. 104 
 
From the above experimental images, unlike the horizontal or vertical embedded result, the visual 
difference is relatively reduced as the area of variation is averagely distributed in the stego image. As 
shown in Figure 92 & 93 below, the visual result is compared in StABridge.png with the algorithm LSB5 
between the horizontal embedding and randomness embedding. 
 
Figure 92: The stego image visual result in LSB 5, with a large size of data in vertically embedded. 
 
 
Figure 93: The stego image visual result in LSB 5, with a large size of data file with a  random embedding 
algorithm . 
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4.2.3. Phase 2: Determine the potential visual Threshold  
As the size of the embedding data increases the affected areas of the image become more visually 
evident. These areas have become distorted, with the application of replaced bits during the 
embedding process, especially with the embedding of large data files. Thus, the stego algorithm can 
be seen as a procedure that injects noise into the cover image [51].  
The quality of a stego image is inversely proportional to the volume of injected noise. By looking for 
the existing distortion, the stego image that is injected and the associated noise can be distinguished 
from the cover image. Fyffe [64] presented good literature references to describe and verify the 
human visual based perception for steganography as well as a discussion on stego images, LSB 
algorithms and detection via distortion rates, especially when the replaced bits exceed more than 
LSB3. However, this result cannot be seen as the identification of the LSB algorithm threshold in the 
steganographic technique. The identification result of distortion can be affected by various factors, 
including the colour intensity of image background and the distribution of embedded data, as 
mentioned in the above sub-section. Therefore, the value of the detection threshold should be 
identified by combining more factors, such as the relevant image measurement units, rather than the 
boundary of imperceptible distortion (noise) within human visual perception only.  
As shown in the Tables 3 – 5 below, the Pixel Transfers Rates (PTR) value was calculated based on the 
LSB algorithm under the different conditions, such as the replaced bits variable and different secret 
data files. The value of PTR undergoes a significant decrease when there is an increase of replaced bits 
n. Therefore, the measurement unit PTR is proportional to the size of embedded data, but it is 
inversely proportional to the replaced bit n. 
PTR for Images with Different LSB replacements for a very short secret message (20 bytes)  
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lena.bmp  0.02% 0.01% 0.006% 0.005% 0.004% 0.003% 0.0029% 0.0025% 
ModrianTree.bmp 0.0038% 0.0019% 0.0013% 0.0009% 0.0008% 0.0006% 0.0005% 0.0004% 
Tiger.bmp 0.069% 0.034% 0.023% 0.017% 0.014% 0.012% 0.009% 0.008% 
Cathedral.jpg  0.047% 0.023% 0.016% 0.012% 0.01% 0.008% 0.007% 0.006% 
Edinburgh.jpg 0.021% 0.011% 0.007% 0.005% 0.004% 0.0035% 0.003% 0.0026% 
Lena.png 0.02% 0.01% 0.006% 0.005% 0.004% 0.003% 0.0029% 0.0025% 
StABridge.png 0.024% 0.012% 0.008% 0.006% 0.005% 0.004% 0.0035% 0.003% 
Table 3: The result of PTR with different LSB replace bits, for a short size data file. 
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PTR for Images with Different LSB replacements for a small size message (42 KB) 
 
LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp 40.61% 20.30% 13.54% 10.15% 8.12% 6.77% 5.80% 5.08% 
ModrianTree.bmp 7.67% 3.84% 2.56% 1.92% 1.53% 1.28% 1.09% 0.96% 
Tiger.bmp 
 
69.30% 46.20% 34.65% 27.72% 23.10% 19.80% 17.32% 
Cathedral.jpg 93.49% 46.75% 31.16% 23.37% 18.70% 15.58% 13.36% 11.69% 
Edinburgh.jpg 42.21% 21.11% 14.07% 10.55% 8.44% 7.04% 6.03% 5.28% 
Lena.png 40.61% 20.30% 13.54% 10.15% 8.12% 6.77% 5.80% 5.08% 
StABridge.png 48.86% 24.43% 16.29% 12.21% 9.77% 8.14% 6.98% 6.10% 
Table 4: The result of PTR with different LSB replace bits, for a small size data file. 
 
PTR for Images with Different LSB replacements for a large size message (119 KB) 
 
LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp 97.49% 48.74% 32.50% 24.37% 19.50% 16.25% 13.93% 12.19% 
ModrianTree.bmp 18.42% 9.21% 6.14% 4.60% 3.68% 3.07% 2.63% 2.30% 
Tiger.bmp 
   
83.19% 66.55% 55.46% 47.54% 41.59% 
Cathedral.jpg 
  
74.83% 56.12% 44.89% 37.41% 32.07% 28.06% 
Edinburgh.jpg 
 
50.68% 33.78% 25.34% 20.28% 16.89% 14.48% 12.67% 
Lena.png 97.49% 48.74% 32.50% 24.37% 19.50% 16.25% 13.93% 12.19% 
StABridge.png 
 
58.65% 39.10% 29.32% 23.46% 19.55% 16.76% 14.66% 
Table 5: The result of PTR with different LSB replace bit, for a large size data file. 
 
Next, as shown in Table 6 – 8 below, the PSNR is presented with different LSB algorithms, which have 
been implemented with the very short data file (20 bytes), small size data file (42 KB) and large size 
data file (119KB) respectively. Normally, the PSNR represents the quality of image after injection of 
the noise. Here, this value denotes the quality of the stego image, and it shows a regular decrease 
through increasing replaced bits n. 
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Images in Different LSB algorithm with a short size data (20 bytes)， PSNR  
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp  87.8966 84.1428 80.565 74.8188 70.7913 64.3026 56.635 54.4044 
ModrianTree.bmp 95.5743 92.15 86.843 81.5995 77.8044 71.644 65.8269 64.6837 
Tiger.bmp 83.1823 78.6807 74.7833 68.8821 64.1296 56.5398 55.5495 55.455 
Cathedral.jpg  84.7147 80.0609 77.7599 70.1228 65.6962 63.2659 53.3547 57.9495 
Edinburgh.jpg 87.9423 83.8223 79.0867 75.6801 70.2106 65.0496 59.5871 58.0296 
Lena.png 87.8966 84.1428 80.565 74.8188 70.7913 64.3026 56.635 54.4044 
Modrian.png 92.0814 86.3932 81.0704 74.9505 70.9872 65.3621 59.0501 53.8722 
StABridge.png 87.5334 83.4737 79.3998 74.9614 69.9242 64.7897 55.2974 59.3559 
Table 6: The result of PSNR with different LSB replace bit, for a short size data file. 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Small size data (42 KB)， PSNR 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp  55.0502 50.5015 46.7445 41.7662 37.0966 31.3968 27.1656 23.1781 
ModrianTree.bmp 62.3016 57.7675 54.0163 49.2764 44.2707 38.0667 34.0729 31.6379 
Tiger.bmp   45.1958 41.4377 36.5983 31.4848 25.8304 21.5112 22.3038 
Cathedral.jpg  51.4481 46.9013 43.1292 38.4403 33.3533 27.5782 22.5752 19.9057 
Edinburgh.jpg 54.8853 50.3406 46.5321 41.6851 36.6524 31.1613 26.0346 22.0725 
Lena.png 55.0502 50.5015 46.7445 41.7662 37.0966 31.3968 27.1656 23.1781 
Modrian.png 59.774 54.0478 49.3926 44.5531 39.4495 33.8858 28.639 22.7656 
StABridge.png 54.2641 49.7087 45.9368 41.2664 36.2349 30.5299 25.6643 20.2394 
Table 7: The result of PSNR with different LSB replace bit, for a small size data file. 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Large size data (100 KB)， PSNR 
 
LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp 51.2448 46.7001 42.9225 37.9999 33.3183 27.6487 22.239 17.1854 
ModrianTree.bmp 58.491 53.9527 50.203 45.4608 40.4743 34.4072 30.1762 27.8316 
Tiger.bmp 
   
32.8255 27.7445 22.2494 17.7332 16.4262 
Cathedral.jpg 
  
39.3308 34.6137 29.5077 23.5822 18.648 15.8614 
Edinburgh.jpg 
 
46.5208 46.6918 37.8154 32.8547 27.3779 22.2979 18.5529 
Lena.png 51.2448 46.7001 42.9225 37.9999 33.3183 27.6487 22.239 17.1854 
Modrian.png 55.879 50.2433 45.6369 40.8125 35.6901 30.1468 24.9079 19.2195 
StABridge.png 
 
45.8939 42.119 37.4525 32.3639 26.7355 21.7479 16.2661 
Table 8: The result of PSNR with different LSB replace bit, for a large size data file. 
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According to the details of the above Tables 6 – 8, the corresponding PSNR distribution charts can be 
generated, as shown in Figure 94 – 96 below. Appreciably, a linear decrease can be viewed with the 
increasing replaced bits. Also the value of PSNR depends on the size of injected noise (data). 
 
Figure 94: The PSNR distribution of experimental images, embedded a very short size data file. (20 bytes) 
 
 
Figure 95: The PSNR distribution of experimental images, embedded a small size data file. (42 KB) 
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Figure 96: The PSNR distribution of experimental images, embedded a large size data file.  (119 KB) 
However, it is difficult to identify the threshold of an LSB replacement algorithm from the distribution 
of PSNR due to its linear change. Although, these charts demonstrate that the quality of image has 
been reduced towards the higher LSB end with the increase of replaced bits n, a significant difference 
is hard to identify.  Thus, the second measurement unit was implemented to identify this threshold. 
As shown in Tables 9 – 11 below, the MSE is presented with different LSB algorithms, which were 
implemented with a very short data (20 bytes), a small size data (42 KB) and a large size of data (119 
KB) respectively. The MSE represents the difference between the cover image and the stego image 
and is inversely proportional to the replaced bits n. 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with very short size message (20 bytes)， MSE 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp  0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0021 0.0054 0.0241 0.1411 0.2359 
ModrianTree.bmp 1.80E-05 3.96E-05 1.35E-04 4.50E-04 0.0011 4.50E-03 1.70E-02 0.0221 
Tiger.bmp 3.13E-04 8.81E-04 0.0022 0.0084 0.0251 0.1442 0.1812 0.1852 
Cathedral.jpg  2.20E-04 6.41E-04 0.0011 0.0063 0.0175 0.0307 0.3003 0.1043 
Edinburgh.jpg 1.04E-04 2.70E-04 8.02E-04 0.0018 0.0062 0.0203 0.0715 0.1024 
Lena.png 1.06E-04 2.51E-04 5.71E-04 0.0021 0.0054 0.0241 0.1411 0.2359 
Modrian.png 4.03E-05 1.49E-04 5.08E-04 0.0021 0.0052 0.0189 0.0809 0.2666 
StABridge.png 1.15E-04 2.92E-04 7.47E-04 0.0021 0.0066 0.0216 0.192 0.0754 
Table 9: The result of MSE with different LSB replace bit, for a short size data file. 
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Images in Different LSB algorithm with Small size message (42 KB)， MSE 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp  0.2033 0.5793 1.376 4.3297 12.6888 47.1416 124.8889 312.8001 
ModrianTree.bmp 0.0383 0.1087 0.2579 0.7681 2.4323 10.1488 25.4561 44.5957 
Tiger.bmp   1.9656 4.67 14.2313 46.1955 169.8421 459.1533 382.5622 
Cathedral.jpg  0.4659 1.3272 3.1635 9.3122 30.0436 113.568 359.385 664.5241 
Edinburgh.jpg 0.2111 0.6012 1.445 4.4114 14.0552 49.7685 162.0401 403.4895 
Lena.png 0.2033 0.5793 1.376 4.3297 12.6888 47.1416 124.8889 312.8001 
Modrian.png 0.0685 0.256 0.7479 2.2791 7.3812 26.5764 88.9567 343.9684 
StABridge.png 0.2436 0.6954 1.6573 4.8578 15.4735 57.5563 176.46 615.3696 
Table 10: The result of MSE with different LSB replace bit, for a small size data file. 
 
Image in Different LSB algorithm with Large size message (119 KB)， MSE 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
Lean.bmp  0.4882 1.3902 3.3177 10.306 30.2869 111.7404 388.3093 1.24E+03 
ModrianTree.bmp 0.092 0.2617 0.6206 1.8493 5.8298 23.5699 62.44 107.1327 
Tiger.bmp       33.9258 109.3019 387.3826 1.10E+03 1.48E+03 
Cathedral.jpg      7.5857 22.4754 72.8299 285.0088 887.7255 1.69E+03 
Edinburgh.jpg   1.4488 3.4986 10.7534 33.6985 118.9304 383.0841 907.3879 
Lena.png 0.4882 1.3902 3.3177 10.306 30.2869 111.7404 388.3093 1.24E+03 
Modrian.png 0.168 0.6148 1.7758 5.393 17.5417 62.8633 210.0325 7.78E+02 
StABridge.png   1.6737 3.9919 11.6903 37.7299 137.8901 434.8029 1.54E+03 
Table 11: The result of MSE with different LSB replace bit, for a large size data file. 
 
According to the details of the above Tables 9 – 11, the corresponding MSE distribution charts are 
generated, as shown in Figure 97 – 99. However, this distribution is not similar to the PSNR’s; the 
change is not regular and can be divided into three phase: 
- Phase 1, from LSB 1 to LSB 3, the distribution is horizontal across the X axis.  
- Phase 2, from LSB 3 to LSB 4, there is a negligible rise. 
- Phase 3, after the LSB 4, there is a significant increase. 
(NB: The distribution of LSB 8 may be affected by image background intensity.) 
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Figure 97: The MSE distribution of experimental images, embedded a very short size data file. (20 bytes) 
 
 
Figure 98: The MSE distribution of experimental images, embedded a small size data file. (42 KB) 
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Figure 99: The MSE distribution of experimental images, embedded a large size data file. (119 KB) 
Therefore, according to the above distribution charts, the PSNR chart presents the reduction of image 
quality with the increase of replaced bits n, which means the stego image is becoming more distorted. 
In the MSE charts, due to its irregular distribution, the difference value in LSB 3 and LSB 4 can be seen 
as the turning point in the overall profiles. Combined with the result a thesis investigating human 
perception of LSB steganography[64], the threshold of the LSB replacement algorithm can be 
identified by relevant measurement units as well as by human perception, near to LSB 3. 
(NB: There are some distribution results for the random position data embedding, for the relevant 
details please check the section, Appendix C).  
 
4.2.4. Phase 3: Verify the applicability and reliability of solutions 
Experiment 1:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
StABridge.png dataTest.txt (20 bytes) LSB1 
 
As shown in Figure 100 below, a visual comparison is made between the original PNG image (left) and 
stego LSB-1 PNG image after embedding data (right). 
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Figure 100: The visual comparison between the original image and the stego image in LSB 1 
The colour frequency histograms between the two images above were compared. The distribution, in 
this example, was almost identical as the size of embedded data was negligible, as shown in Figure 
101 below: 
 
Figure 101: The histogram comparison between the cover image and stego image in LSB 1 
Next, embedded data was extracted from the above stego image according to its Key information (LSB 
1), and the secret data can be read accurately, as shown in Figure 102 below: 
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Figure 102: The extracted result from the stego image by using the stego key 
 
Solution 1: Presentation Domain Transformation (PDT) 
Converting the stego image to a frequency domain, which is from a PNG file format to a JPEG. The 
visual and histogram chart between the original stego image (PNG in left) and the newly converted 
stego image (JPEG in right) are compared to establish differences and variations, as shown in Figures 
103 & 104 below. Although under visual comparison the images appear identical, the colour frequency 
distribution has been changed under  the conversion as seen in the histogram comparison and is noted 
by the red circles in the chart. 
 
Figure 103: The visual comparison between the Original stego image and the Transformed stego image 
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Figure 104: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Transformed stego image 
 
The same key (LSB 1) is used to extract the embedded data from the newly generated image (.jpg), 
presented in the frequency domain, as shown in the Figure 105 below. Saving the image in JPEG format 
can destroy the embedded message due to the manipulation of the JPEG (frequency domain) 
compression. 
 
Figure 105: The extracted result from the Transformed stego image by using the same stego key 
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In addition, due to the lossy compression, saving this image back to the spatial domain (e.g. BMP, 
PNG) will not recover the message, as shown in Figure 106:  
 
Figure 106: The extracted result after transform back to the previous image format. 
 
Solution 2: Chrominance Modification Algorithm (CMA) 
The modified stego image can be generated from the original stego image due to the CMA algorithm. 
This newly generated image has a negligible difference in colour intensity as its value is affected 
through changing the value of chrominance. As shown in Figures 107 & 108 below, the comparison of 
both the visual and histogram chart between the original stego image (left) and the newly modified 
stego image (right) is established to look for the differences and variations. As with the  PDT solution, 
although under visual comparison the images appear identical, the colour frequency distribution has 
been changed under the conversion and  is noted by the red rectangles in the blue frequency chart of 
the histograms in Figure 108. 
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Figure 107: The visual comparison between the Original stego image and the Modified stego image 
 
Figure 108: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Modified stego image 
By using the same key (LSB 1) to extract the embedded data from the newly modified stego image, 
the data is unreadable, as shown in the Figure 109 below.  
 
Figure 109: The extracted result from the Modified stego image by using the same stego key 
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In addition, the secret data after this modification is still unrecoverable due to the randomness in the 
algorithm modification during execution.  
 
Experiment 2:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
StABridge.png dataLarge.txt (119 KB) LSB 2 
 
Firstly, the comparisons between the visual and histogram are established, as seen in Figures 110 & 
111. Results show that the visuals are the same, due to the replacement of the lowest bits that cannot 
significantly affect the quality of image. The differences, however, can be easily detected by using 
histogram detection as the hidden data, in this case, has a large volume. 
 
Figure 110: The visual comparison between the cover image and the stego image in LSB 2 
 
Figure 111: The histogram comparison between the cover image and the stego image in LSB 2 
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Solution 1: PDT 
Convert the stego image format from PNG to JPEG. Although the images under visual comparison 
appear identical, the histogram has a significant difference in the blue colour channel as the converted 
JPEG image has a less ragged profile, as shown in Figure 112. 
 
Figure 112: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Transformed stego image 
Next, comparing the extracted result between these two images in the Figure 113 below. The results 
indicated that the extracted data was still not readable after converting back to the previous image 
format. 
 
Figure 113: The comparison of extracted result between the Original stego image and the Transformed stego 
image by using the same stego key 
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Solution 2: CMA 
As shown in Figure 114, the comparison between the stego image and modified stego image can be 
established after the execution of the CMA algorithm. Although the difference cannot be distinguished 
from the visual detection, it can be found in the colour frequency histogram comparison, see Figure 
115.  
(NB: This histogram difference is appreciably lower than the converted stego image in solution1.) 
 
Figure 114: The visual comparison between the Original stego image and the Modified stego image 
 
 
Figure 115: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Modified stego image 
The data extracted result is still unreadable due to the change of colour intensity, as shown in Figure 
116. Also, this data is unrecoverable because of the randomness in the CMA algorithm. 
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Figure 116: The extracted result in the Modified stego image by using the same stego key 
 
Experiment 3:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
Lena.bmp dataSmall.txt (42 KB) LSB 2 
 
As shown in Figure 117 below, there is a visual comparison between the original BMP image (left) and 
the stego LSB 1 PNG image after embedding the secret data (right). The difference in visual comparison 
is undiscoverable because of the low number of replaced bits in the embedding algorithm and the 
bright background colour in the cover image. 
 
Figure 117: The visual comparison between the cover image (Lena.bmp) and the stego image (Lena.png) in LSB 
2 
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The histogram is affected due to the large volume of data embedded, see Figure 118, a significant 
“ragged profile” occurred in the stego image colour distribution. 
 
Figure 118: The histogram comparison between the cover image (Lena.bmp) and the stego image (Lena.png) in LSB 2 
Solution 1: PDT 
As with the previous experiment, the image under human visual detection is unaffected by 
implementing the image presentation conversion, even from the “lossless” image file to the “lossy”. 
The comparison of both the visual detection and colour frequency histogram are shown in Figures 119 
and 120. Although the images are identical under visual detection, an appreciable difference is 
displayed in the histogram detection as the distribution of colour intensity has become extremely 
smooth.   
 
Figure 119: The visual comparison between the Original stego image and the Converted stego image 
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Figure 120: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Converted stego image 
The extracted data is unreadable along with the change of colour intensity in the image. As seen in 
Figure 121, the data extracted result has been compared between the original stego image (left) and 
the converted stego (right) image by using the same key. Also the data is unrecoverable because of 
the lossy compression during the image presentation conversion.  
 
Figure 121: Comparison of the extracted result between the Original stego image (LSB 2) and the Converted 
stego image (LSB 2) from using the same key 
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Solution 2: CMA 
As with the above experiments, the visual and histogram comparison between the stego image and 
modified stego image can be established and the difference can be distinguished from the histogram 
detection only, as seen in Figure 122 & 123 below.  
 
Figure 122: The visual comparison between the Original stego image (LSB 2) and the Modified stego image (LSB 
2) 
 
 
Figure 123: The histogram comparison between the Original stego image and the Modified stego image 
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The data extracted result is unreadable and is unrecoverable due to the randomness of the CMA 
algorithm, as shown in Figure 124. 
 
Figure 124: The extracted result in the Modified stego image by using the same stego key 
 
4.3. Analysis 
Either the Presentation Domain Transform (PDT) or Chrominance Modification Algorithm (CMA) can 
break the insider hiding confidential data of images to prevent potential data loss behaviour. In order 
to identify their efficiency, the relevant measurement units were analysed through these three 
experiments respectively.  
 
In Experiment 1:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
StABridge.png dataTest.txt (20 bytes) LSB 1 
 
As shown in Figure 125 below, the PSNR is computed by the MATLAB insider library. In the PDT 
solution, PSNR = 39.2671; in the CMA solution, PSNR = 43.2133.  
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Figure 125: The PSNR comparison between the PDT solution and CMA solution in StABrdige.png with LSB 1 
Next, the MSE is compared between these solutions. Where, in the PDT solution, MSE = 7.6979; in the 
CMA, MSE = 3.1028, as shown in Figure 126 below: 
 
Figure 126: The MSE comparison between the PDT solution and CMA solution in StABridge.png with LSB 1 
Particularly, in the comparison of image differences, an obvious benefit is from the CMA solution, 
which reduces to around 50% value of the PDT value. Therefore, by using the CMA solution, the newly 
generated image has not only a higher quality, but also a lower difference with the original image. 
 
In Experiment 2:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
StABridge.png dataLarge.txt (119 KB) LSB 2 
 
As shown in Figure 127 & 128 below, the PSNR and MSE is computed respectively. In the PDT solution, 
PSNR = 38.4364, MSE = 9.3206; in the CMA solution, PSNR = 43.2020, MSE = 3.1109.  Again, the CMA 
solution has a better result than PDT, and a significant optimization is reflected in the comparison as 
well, which was reduced to around 66% of the PDT value. 
 
Figure 127: The PSNR comparison between the PDT solution and CMA solution in StABrdige.png with LSB 2 
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Figure 128: The MSE comparison between the PDT solution and CMA solution in StABridge.png with LSB 2 
 
In Experiment 3:  
Cover Image Secret Data Algorithm 
Lena.bmp dataSmall.txt (42 KB) LSB 2 
 
As with the above evaluations, a higher image quality can be obtained after executing the CMA 
solution, and compared with the PDT solution, it has a negligible difference to the original image, as 
shown in Figure 129 to 130. 
 
Figure 129: The PSNR comparison between the PDT solution and CMA solution in Lena.bmp with LSB 2 
 
 
Figure 130: The MSE comparison between the PDT solution and the CMA solution in Lena.bmp with LSB 2 
Consequently, from the above initial comparisons, for these images, a better image can be generated 
by using the CMA solution. Although both solutions can generate the images with a relative good 
quality, the CMA solution can avoid higher differences in the images.  
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5. Evaluation  
In order to evaluate which solution is better between PDT and CMA, both solutions should be 
implemented in more images. In the following experiments, the images which were used to distinguish 
the visual difference from the above Experiment Section Phase 1 were selected randomly, and the 
corresponding experimental results are displayed below. Four images are used to execute the relevant 
LSB algorithms based on the variable replaced bits n, to prove the reliability of the initial evaluation; 
these are StABridge.png, Edinburgh.jpg, MondrianTree.bmp and Lena.bmp.  
 
In StABridge.png  
Comparing the PSNR result in Tables 12 & 13, in the PDT solution, the value is not only lower than 
CMA, but is also irregular. The quality is reduced towards the end due to the increase of the target 
image distortion which is caused by the large volume of embedding data. Also, the average of each 
embedded data by using LSB from 1 to 8 is different in PDT, which is subject to the size of the 
embedding data and its embedding method (horizontal & randomness in this case.). Instead, in the 
CMA solution, the result value is extremely regular, this balance is not broken by the other factors of 
data size and embedding method. The average is maintained at 43.20.   
StABridge.png, PSNR result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 39.2671 39.267 39.2667 39.2661 39.2644 39.2567 39.2129 39.2377 
SmallSizeData 39.1274 38.9408 38.6779 38.2625 36.3571 32.5495 29.844 34.8547 
LargeSizeData   38.4364 37.9593 37.1001 34.1189 29.291 26.3126 32.1319 
ShortSizeData Random 39.2674 39.2669 39.2665 39.2662 39.2659 39.2516 39.2163 39.1604 
SmallSizeData Random 39.123 38.8875 38.4847 37.3611 34.7773 30.9096 27.041 22.5478 
LargeSizeData Random   38.4472 36.3625 35.8581 32.3161 28.0115 23.7552 19.2674 
Table 12: The PSNR result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in StABridge.png 
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StABridge.png, PSNR result in CMA 
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LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
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PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 43.2133 43.2135 43.2102 43.2087 43.2073 43.2078 43.2114 43.2106 
SmallSizeData 43.2041 43.2048 43.2084 43.2054 43.2097 43.209 43.2072 43.2092 
LargeSizeData  43.202 43.1926 43.1911 43.1966 43.2012 43.2048 43.1995 
ShortSizeData Random 43.2068 43.2094 43.211 43.2091 43.2075 43.2112 43.2115 43.2098 
SmallSizeData Random 43.2082 43.2103 43.2015 43.1982 43.2088 43.2046 43.2114 43.2214 
LargeSizeData Random  43.1996 43.2013 43.1962 43.2005 43.1988 43.2007 43.2326 
Table 13: The PSNR result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in StABridge.png 
In the following Tables 14 & 15, the MSE result is displayed from implementing both the PDT solution 
and the CMA solution respectively. Firstly, the MSE value in PDT is unstable, and the fluctuation in the 
result is appreciable. The error difference (MSE) between the original image and the newly generated 
image has a significant rise due to the increasing size of embedded data. In addition, this fluctuation 
can be affected by the algorithm embedding method (horizontal & randomness). Next, the MSE result 
has an extremely low value in the CMA solution, the average is maintained at around 3.1 and does not 
appear to be affected by the other factors. 
StABridge.png, MSE result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 7.6979 7.698 7.6985 7.6996 7.7027 7.7163 7.7946 7.7501 
SmallSizeData 7.9496 8.2985 8.8164 9.7013 15.0444 36.1518 67.4038 21.2625 
LargeSizeData   9.3206 10.4029 12.6786 25.188 76.5566 151.9923 39.8002 
ShortSizeData Random 7.6973 7.6982 7.699 7.6995 7.7 7.7254 7.7884 7.8892 
SmallSizeData Random 7.9576 8.4009 9.2175 11.9389 21.6448 52.7373 128.5234 361.6588 
LargeSizeData Random   9.2973 15.0257 16.876 38.1482 102.7841 273.878 769.7323 
Table 14: The MSE result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in StABridge.png 
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StABridge.png, MSE result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 3.1028 3.1026 3.105 3.1061 3.107 3.1067 3.1042 3.1047 
SmallSizeData 3.1094 3.1088 3.1062 3.1084 3.1054 3.1058 3.1072 3.1057 
LargeSizeData   3.1109 3.1176 3.1187 3.1147 3.1114 3.1089 3.1126 
ShortSizeData Random 3.1074 3.1056 3.1044 3.1058 3.1069 3.1043 3.104 3.1053 
SmallSizeData Random 3.1064 3.1049 3.1112 3.1136 3.106 3.109 3.1041 3.097 
LargeSizeData Random   3.1126 3.1114 3.115 3.1119 3.1132 3.1118 3.089 
Table 15: The MSE result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in StABridge.png 
 
In Edinburgh.jpg 
Only the horizontal embedding method was implemented to conceal the data during the algorithm 
process In the Edinburgh.jpg image. The PDT solution can affect the decrease in the PSNR result, 
although the reduction is not appreciable. Instead, in the CMA solution, the PSNR value is maintained 
at around 43.20, as shown in Tables 16 & 17 below: 
 
Edinburgh.jpg, PSNR result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 40.2031 40.203 40.2027 40.2022 40.1995 40.191 40.1736 40.1655 
SmallSizeData 40.0351 39.811 39.3725 38.7516 36.2633 32.6194 29.6045 35.5168 
LargeSizeData   39.1836 38.3691 37.29 33.5712 29.1961 26.0479 32.8166 
Table 16: The PSNR result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Edinburgh.jpg, PSNR result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 43.203 43.2016 43.2017 43.1997 43.2025 43.2005 43.2009 43.2023 
SmallSizeData 43.1937 43.1948 43.1919 43.1949 43.1985 43.1929 43.1981 43.1916 
LargeSizeData   43.1907 43.1831 43.1863 43.1865 43.1904 43.2027 43.1858 
Table 17: The PSNR result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in Edinburgh.jpg 
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In the MSE comparison, as shown in Tables 18 & 19. The MSE value has a significant rise with the 
increasing embedded data size in the PDT solution. This means the difference between the original 
image and the newly generated image is increased through LSB 1 to LSB 8. However, in the CMA 
solution, the MSE value is stable around 3.11.  
Edinburgh.jpg, MSE result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 6.2055 6.2055 6.206 6.2067 6.2105 6.2227 6.2477 6.2593 
SmallSizeData 6.4502 6.7917 7.5133 8.6681 15.3727 35.5749 71.2253 18.2556 
LargeSizeData   7.8472 9.4661 12.136 28.5736 78.2477 161.5429 33.9955 
Table 18: The MSE result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Edinburgh.jpg, MSE result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 3.1102 3.1112 3.1111 3.1125 3.1105 3.1119 3.1117 3.1106 
SmallSizeData 3.1168 3.116 3.1181 3.1159 3.1134 3.1174 3.1136 3.1183 
LargeSizeData   3.119 3.1244 3.1221 3.122 3.1192 3.1103 3.1225 
Table 19: The MSE result in CMA solution with variable replaced  bits, in Edinburgh.jpg 
 
In MondrianTree.bmp 
In the ModrianTree.bmp image, the PDT solution can cause the quality (PSNR) to reduce with the 
increase in embedded data. The change is not appreciable as the size of the target image is relatively 
big. The CMA approach still maintains the quality (PSNR) around 43.15. Moreover, in the MSE result 
tables, the difference (MSE) has a slow rise with the increase of distortion in the original image in the 
PDT solution. Instead, in the CMA solution, this value averages around 3.144, as shown in Tables 20 
to 23 below.  
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MondrianTree.bmp, PSNR result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 49.382 49.382 49.3812 49.3799 49.3774 49.3602 49.3386 49.3223 
SmallSizeData 49.0966 48.7789 48.1615 47.5428 44.7677 40.7918 38.0238 43.4996 
LargeSizeData 48.7208 48.0607 46.8889 45.878 42.5559 37.4933 34.3983 40.5545 
Table 20: The PSNR result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in MondrianTree.bmp 
 
MondrianTree.bmp, PSNR result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 43.1565 43.1563 43.1579 43.156 43.1555 43.1573 43.1561 43.1554 
SmallSizeData 43.1549 43.1569 43.1553 43.1568 43.1558 43.1551 43.1585 43.1539 
LargeSizeData 43.1544 43.1545 43.1568 43.1566 43.1558 43.1558 43.1617 43.1558 
Table 21: The PSNR result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in MondrianTree.bmp 
 
MondrianTree.bmp, MSE result in PDT 
Stego-LSB5 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 0.7497 0.7497 0.7498 0.7501 0.7505 0.7535 0.7572 0.7601 
SmallSizeData 0.8006 0.8614 0.993 1.145 2.1692 5.4187 10.2494 2.9048 
LargeSizeData 0.873 1.0163 1.331 1.6799 3.6099 11.5812 23.6186 5.7231 
Table 22: The MSE result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in MondrianTree.bmp 
 
MondrianTree.bmp, MSE result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 3.1436 3.1438 3.1426 3.144 3.1443 3.1431 3.1439 3.1444 
SmallSizeData 3.1448 3.1433 3.1445 3.1434 3.1441 3.1446 3.1421 3.1455 
LargeSizeData 3.1451 3.1451 3.1434 3.1435 3.1441 3.142 3.1399 3.1441 
Table 23: The MSE result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in MondrianTree.bmp 
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However, in this case, the CMA solution is not better than the PDT; the specific explanation can be 
found in the MSE tables. Besides the serious distortion to images, the newly generated image has a 
tiny difference in the PDT solution, and the differences value can be kept low as 1.    
 
In Lena.bmp 
For the below Tables 24 to 27, and as above with the StABridge.png, a better quality image can be 
generated by the CMA solution as it has a higher PSNR value and a lower MSE compared with the PDT 
solution. This result can be maintained at 43.20 in PSNR and 3.12 in MSE. But the fluctuation can be 
caused by the PDT solution, due to the increase in the embedded data size. The PSNR value is then 
decreased and MSE value is increased. 
Lena.bmp, PSNR result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 35.6271 35.627 35.627 35.6268 35.6262 35.623 35.6111 35.6158 
SmallSizeData 35.5889 35.4922 35.3722 35.1392 34.2232 31.7085 30.0484 33.4555 
LargeSizeData 35.5377 35.3511 35.0789 34.5057 32.7534 29.1568 26.6446 31.5906 
ShortSizeData Random 35.6272 35.6273 35.6275 35.6265 35.6263 35.6232 35.609 35.6068 
SmallSizeData Random 35.5885 35.5133 35.3664 34.8807 33.5634 30.9852 27.4113 23.6067 
LargeSizeData Random 35.5312 35.355 35.0192 34.0965 31.8508 28.4506 24.3247 20.3244 
Table 24: The PSNR result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in Lena.bmp 
 
Lena.bmp, PSNR result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
ShortSizeData 43.1766 43.1808 43.1822 43.1798 43.1774 43.1807 43.181 43.1794 
SmallSizeData 43.1759 43.1774 43.1816 43.191 43.2053 43.2094 43.2163 43.1685 
LargeSizeData 43.178 43.1795 43.1783 43.1945 43.2101 43.2118 43.2155 43.1726 
ShortSizeData Random 43.1745 43.1826 43.1758 43.1796 43.1803 43.1822 43.1838 43.1789 
SmallSizeData Random 43.1793 43.1795 43.1803 43.1807 43.1811 43.19 43.2054 43.2097 
LargeSizeData Random 43.1786 43.1784 43.1758 43.1811 43.1821 43.2028 43.2355 43.2435 
Table 25: The PSNR result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in Lena.bmp 
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Lena.bmp, MSE result in PDT 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 17.7979 17.7982 17.7983 17.7991 17.8017 17.8146 17.8637 17.8443 
SmallSizeData 17.9551 18.3593 18.8738 19.914 24.5903 43.8767 64.3038 29.345 
LargeSizeData 18.168 18.9659 20.1927 23.0417 34.4939 78.9581 140.8067 45.0837 
ShortSizeData Random 17.7974 17.7972 17.7965 17.8004 17.8013 17.814 17.8724 17.8814 
SmallSizeData Random 17.9568 18.2706 18.899 21.1352 28.6245 51.8273 118.0192 283.4065 
LargeSizeData Random 18.1953 18.9488 20.4718 25.3181 42.4617 92.9019 240.2232 603.4446 
Table 26: The MSE result in PDT solution with variable replaced bits, in Lena.bmp 
 
Lena.bmp, MSE result in CMA 
 
Stego-
LSB1 
Stego-
LSB2 
Stego-
LSB3 
Stego-
LSB4 
Stego-
LSB5 
Stego-
LSB6 
Stego-
LSB7 
Stego-
LSB8 
 
MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
ShortSizeData 3.1291 3.1261 3.1251 3.1268 3.1286 3.1262 3.1259 3.1271 
SmallSizeData 3.1296 3.1285 3.1255 3.1188 3.1085 3.1056 3.1006 3.135 
LargeSizeData 3.1281 3.127 3.1279 3.1163 3.105 3.1038 3.1012 3.132 
ShortSizeData Random 3.1306 3.1248 3.1297 3.1269 3.1264 3.1251 3.1239 3.1277 
SmallSizeData Random 3.1272 3.127 3.1264 3.1262 3.1259 3.1195 3.1084 3.1053 
LargeSizeData Random 3.1277 3.1278 3.1297 3.1258 3.1251 3.1103 3.087 3.0813 
Table 27: The MSE result in CMA solution with variable replaced bits, in Lena.bmp 
As mentioned in the Literature Review Section above, the pixel value can be changed to implement 
data hiding in the cover image. Hence, in the stego image, the change of pixels can affect the 
distribution of the embedded data to break the extracted result and make the message unreadable. 
Any solutions to protect against corporate loss in a DLP system should be implemented efficiently and 
effectively, without reducing the quality of the target image, as many images sent are normal images 
in network traffic. This is the reason why these two solutions (PDT & CMA) were presented rather 
than an implementation of the image blur or image resize directly.    
From the above details, in comparing the two solutions, an irregular result can be generated by using 
the PDT solution, whether in the PSNR or in the MSE. The quality reduces and the error differences 
between the original image and the newly generated image becomes appreciable with the increase 
of original image distortion, caused by a large volume of embedded data.  
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However, for the real data loss threats that are caused by steganography, the advanced algorithms 
would not cause a serious image distortion, otherwise, the ‘malicious’ images can be identified from 
a blacklist image stream by network monitoring tools. In the experiments above, the data output 
conveys a wider set of results to represent how the two proposed solutions can break steganographic 
images in various ways. (NB: The results of LSB 1 and LSB 2 are extremely close to the other advanced 
algorithms.)  
Furthermore, both solutions (PDT & CMA) can be implemented easily to prevent the potential data 
loss threat through steganography. The CMA solution has a better execution result than the PDT, the 
newly generated image can be stably maintained in PSNR around 43.20 (±0.1) and MSE around 3.10 
(±0.1). 
However, an exception should be analysed, the large resolution image “ModrianTree.bmp”. In this 
case, a better result was from the PDT solution rather than the CMA, especially shown in the MSE 
Tables. The PDT’s result started from a very small value, almost one quarter of the CMA result. In 
order to identify the reasons for the exception, a hypothesis is defined that the influence is caused by 
the large resolution of the target image. Subsequently, extra experiments were implemented; five of 
the same images with different resolutions were selected from the Internet [60], and  implementing 
the PDT on these images to verify the possibility of this hypothesis. The relevant images and details 
are shown in Figure 131 and Table 28 below. 
 
Figure 131: The experimental image 
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Original 
Image 
Size Resolution 
After 
PDT 
New 
Image 
Size Resolution PSNR MSE 
1.png 77.9KB 320 * 160   1.jpg 14.7KB 320 * 160 39.6229 7.0924 
2.png 281KB 640*320   2.jpg 49.6KB 640*320 40.8765 5.3141 
3.png 424KB 800 * 400   3.jpg 74.2KB 800 * 400 41.0855 5.0644 
4.png 669KB 1024* 512   4.jpg 114KB 1024* 512 41.4569 4.6493 
5.png 2.54MB 2048 * 1024   5.jpg 411KB 2048 * 1024 40.9211 5.2072 
Table 28: The PSNR and MSE results in the experimental images after executing the PDT solution 
 
From the above table, the MSE did not reduce with the increase of image resolution, the change was 
a fluctuation, and it is hard to identify the position of lowest point. Although the image resolution can 
affect the result, it is not the unique factor.  
   Furthermore, as shown in the left Figure 132 and below Table 29, this 
image has a relatively low resolution 253 * 450. Theoretically, the PSNR 
and MSE results should be between the value of 1.png and 2.png from the 
above Table 29, but both values were out of the expected boundaries, 
where the PSNR is 52.8918 and the MSE is 0.3341.  Therefore, from these 
tests, this hypothesis can be defined as correct, the large image resolution 
can improve the generated result, but this is not the only factor that 
causes the change. There may be other factors, such as “background 
colour intensity” that we will investigate further in the future research. 
Figure 132: Cathedral.jpg 
 
 
Table 29: The PSNR and MSE result in Cathedral.jpg image after executing the PDT solution 
Consequently, both solutions are good options to prevent the data loss threat in DLP systems, by 
changing the pixel to break potential insider hidden data.  Comparing these two solutions, PDT can be 
implemented easily and effectively as the target image is compressed to a JPEG image directly, the 
pixels would not be loaded and transformed to other forms (such as, binary form) in the system. 
Instead, although the implementation of the CMA solution can cause extra computing time, it can 
generate a more regular result, and not only does this have a higher quality and lower differences with 
the original image and the newly generated stego image, the result would not be affected by other 
factors, such as image resolution and image background colour intensity. 
Resolution PSNR MSE 
253 * 450 52.8918 0.3341 
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6. Conclusion  
In today’s digital era, data breaches are a common phenomenon for many companies. Whether in 
financial or reputational circumstances, it is a serious cost that must be mitigated where possible. 
Although DLP systems can protect industry against the occurrence of data breaches, the application 
of image steganography can escape the monitoring system, wherein the data bypasses the detection 
by a boundary network and is maliciously or accidentally exported out of a company’s systems. Thus, 
in order to prevent this kind of transmission, two solutions were presented and verified in this thesis 
to be used in the field of steganography; Presentation Domain Transform (PDT) and Chrominance 
Modification Algorithm (CMA). 
Under PDT, implementing the conversion of image presentation domains prevents potential data 
breaches in steganography. The conversion to a JPEG format can affect image pixels, make the image 
histogram smoother, while the extracted data will be unreadable due to the lossy compression 
process in the generation of the JPEG image. Also the embedded data is unrecoverable even if 
converted back to the previous image presentation domain as the quantization process in the jpg 
compression is irreversible. Generally, in LSB algorithms, the JPEG image is not used for hiding 
messages as its generation can cause the changing of pixels through its two lossy processes, DCT and 
Quantization.  
Under CMA, implementing the modification of image chrominance prevents the potential data loss 
threat in steganography. The random operations (1) in chrominance can cause changes to the pixel 
value. The embedded data can be affected due to the fluctuation of pixel values, making the extracted 
result unreadable. Also, this extracted data is unrecoverable because of the randomness modification 
in this algorithm. 
Both solutions use the pixel change to break the embedded data; one utilizes the lossy process 
“Quantization” in the JPEG image generation; the other is dependent on the change of image 
chrominance. Subsequently, the evaluation of the above solutions was verified. According to the 
experimental data, the CMA solution provides a better image which consists of a higher quality (PSNR) 
and lower differences (MSE). Furthermore, the generated result is stable, which would not be affected 
by other factors.  Instead, the generated image from the PDT is not as good as expected, although the 
implementation is fast, the result can be affected by multiple factors, such as image resolution and 
image background colour intensity. 
Consequently, for the boundary network, both solutions can be setup within the DLP system to cause 
fluctuation of image pixel values, so that the newly generated images are still good quality images but 
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with broken hidden messages, especially if this image has hidden data through the steganography LSB 
algorithm. Although the CMA is a better option, the PDT can achieve the same purpose and should be 
considered in future work in the research field of steganography. 
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7. Future Works   
In this thesis, two solutions (PDT & CMA) were originally proposed and implemented within DLP 
system. Although both are effective, they are only examined with respect to the applicability of spatial 
domain images. However, in real steganography cases, the carrier is often chosen from a wide range, 
such as a frequency image (JPEG), voice file, video file and IP packets. Therefore, in future research, 
the solutions applicability will be examined in multiple format images.  Other formats and carrier 
algorithms, especially voice files due to their higher embedding capacity and redundancy, will be 
researched to prevent potential data loss through steganography in DLP systems. 
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Appendix A 
Linkage file method can conceal the secret file, as mentioned in above Methodology section. However, 
the secret file cannot be linked before the cover image. Otherwise the stego image is unreadable. As 
illustrated as follow Figures: 
 
Figure A1: the secret file was concatenated in front of cover image (tiger.bmp) 
 
Figure A2: The stego image cannot be read in the system 
Also, in this method, if the secret file is TXT format. After linked the cover image, the data can be 
readable directly by observing the hex value, as shown in Figure below: 
 
Figure A3: Human readable data can be found by observing the hex value, if the secret file is TXT format 
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Appendix B 
Embedded a short size data file: 
Lena.bmp: 
 
Figure B1: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure B2: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
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Tiger.bmp: 
 
Figure B3: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure B4: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
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Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure B5: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure B6: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure B7: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure B8: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a short size data file. 
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Embedded a small size data file, (42 KB) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure B9: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure B10: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
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Tiger.bmp 
 
Figure B11: Stego images from LSB 2 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. LSB 1 is not enough to conceal the 
secret data 
Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure B12: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
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Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure B13: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure B14: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure B15: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
 
StABridge.png 
Figure B16: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a small size data file. 
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Embedded a large size data file, (119 KB) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure B17: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
 
MondrianTree.bmp 
 
Figure B18: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
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Tiger.bmp 
 
Figure B19: Stego images from LSB 4 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1, LSB 2 and LSB 3 are not enough 
to conceal the secret data file. 
Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure B20: Stego images from LSB 3 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1 and LSB 2 are not enough to 
conceal the secret data file. 
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Edinburgh.jpg 
 
Figure B21: Stego images from LSB 2 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1 is not enough to conceal the 
secret data file. 
 
Lena.png 
 
Figure B22: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure B23: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure B24: Stego images from LSB 2 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1 is not enough to conceal the 
secret data file. 
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Embedded a large size data file., with random positions in the cover image, (119 KB) 
Lena.bmp 
 
Figure B25: Stego images from LSB 1 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
Cathedral.jpg 
 
Figure B26: Stego images from LSB 2 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1 and LSB 2 are not enough to 
conceal the secret data file. 
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Mondrian.png 
 
Figure B27: Stego images from LSB 3 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. 
StABridge.png 
 
Figure B28: Stego images from LSB 2 to LSB 8, with a large size data file. LSB 1 is not enough to conceal the 
secret data file. 
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Appendix C 
No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
1 PSNR From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A short size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Short size data file,  PSNR 
 LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
 PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
Lean.bmp 87.9493 84.5106 79.9778 75.8229 70.2931 65.4612 58.1199 57.6972 
Cathedral.jpg 84.9528 80.3904 75.968 71.7981 66.7573 61.9526 55.0434 53.1763 
Modrian.png 92.0359 87.2048 81.9155 77.1063 72.4719 67.3686 60.4812 54.9635 
StABridge.png 86.9898 83.2955 78.175 74.125 69.468 63.4469 57.7722 54.5356 
Table C1: PSNR result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a short size data file. 
 
No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
2 MSE From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A short size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Short size data,  MSE 
 LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
 MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Lean.bmp 1.04E-04 2.30E-04 6.54E-04 0.0017 0.0061 0.0185 0.1003 0.1105 
Cathedral.jpg 2.08E-04 5.94E-04 0.0016 0.0043 0.0137 0.0415 0.2036 0.3129 
Modrian.png 4.07E-05 1.24E-04 4.18E-04 0.0013 0.0037 0.0119 0.0582 0.2074 
StABridge.png 1.30E-04 3.04E-04 9.90E-04 0.0025 0.0073 0.0294 0.1086 0.2288 
Table C2: MSE result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a short size data. 
 
No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
3 PSNR From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A small size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Small size data file,  PSNR 
 LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
 PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
Lean.bmp 55.0319 50.5128 46.7616 41.8304 36.786 31.491 26.2654 21.4347 
Cathedral.jpg 51.4417 46.8993 43.1348 38.3781 33.2206 27.7671 23.3568 19.5186 
Modrian.png 59.6583 53.8652 49.4396 43.8598 39.0328 33.3797 28.3396 22.0956 
StABridge.png 54.253 49.7129 45.9108 41.1638 36.021 30.4338 25.4765 20.4336 
Table C3: PSNR result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a small size data file. 
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No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
4 MSE From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A small size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Small size data file,  MSE 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
  MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Lean.bmp  0.2041 0.5778 1.3706 4.2662 13.6295 46.1297 153.6544 467.3168 
Cathedral.jpg  0.4666 1.3278 3.1594 9.4465 30.9754 108.7356 300.1922 726.4662 
Modrian.png 0.0703 0.267 0.7398 2.6736 8.1246 29.8611 95.306 401.3491 
StABridge.png 0.2442 0.6947 1.6672 4.9739 16.2547 58.8433 184.2584 588.4631 
Table C4: MSE result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a small size data file. 
 
No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
5 PSNR From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A large size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Large size data file,  PSNR 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
  PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR PSNR 
Lean.bmp  51.2429 46.7175 42.9293 38.0505 32.9881 27.6771 22.4928 17.6361 
Cathedral.jpg      39.3437 34.5689 29.4275 23.9593 19.581 15.7201 
Modrian.png 55.8605 50.0709 45.6369 40.0756 35.2311 29.5645 24.5452 18.3155 
StABridge.png   45.9027 42.1065 37.3702 32.2217 26.617 21.6426 16.6691 
Table C5: PSNR result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a large size data file. 
 
No Measurement Unit Algorithm Embedded Data Size Embedded Method 
6 MSE From LSB 1 to LSB 8 A large size Randomly 
 
Images in Different LSB algorithm with a Large size data file,  MSE 
  LSB 1 LSB 2 LSB 3 LSB 4 LSB 5 LSB 6 LSB 7 LSB 8 
  MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Lean.bmp  0.4884 1.3846 3.3124 10.1867 32.6792 111.0113 366.2703 1.12E+03 
Cathedral.jpg      7.5632 22.7087 74.1874 261.3094 716.117 1.74E+03 
Modrian.png 0.1687 0.6397 1.7758 6.3903 19.4971 71.884 228.3293 958.3587 
StABridge.png   1.6704 4.0034 11.914 38.9866 141.7042 445.4726 1.40E+03 
Table C7: MSE result in images with variable LSB algorithms, randomly embedded a large size data file. 
 
